Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
8-2022

Deregulation and the Lawyers' Cartel
Nuno Garoupa
Milan Markovic

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Law and
Economics Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons

DEREGULATION AND THE LAWYERS’ CARTEL

NUNO GAROUPA* AND MILAN MARKOVIC**

ABSTRACT
At one time, the legal profession largely regulated itself.
However, based on the economic notion that increased competition
would benefit consumers, jurisdictions have deregulated their legal
markets by easing rules relating to attorney advertising, fees, and,
most recently, nonlawyer ownership of law firms. Yet, despite
reformers’ high expectations, legal markets today resemble those of
previous decades, and most legal services continue to be delivered
by traditional law firms. How to account for this seeming inertia?
We argue that the competition paradigm is theoretically flawed
because it fails to fully account for market failures relating to
asymmetric information, imperfect information, and negative
externalities.
In addition, the regulatory costs imposed on
sophisticated consumers such as corporate purchasers of legal
services differ radically from those imposed on ordinary consumers
who use legal services infrequently. Merely increasing the number
and types of legal services providers cannot make legal markets
more efficient. We illustrate our theoretical account with evidence
from the United Kingdom, Europe, and Asia.
For legal markets to better serve the public, regulators must
tailor solutions by segment. Regulators should seek to minimize
negative externalities associated with the delivery of legal services
to the corporate segment and confront information asymmetries that
lead to the maldistribution of legal services in the consumer
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segment. Deregulation alone is insufficient and may in fact
exacerbate existing market failures.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, regulators have internalized the tenet that
lawyers conspire against the laity.1 Across North America, Europe,
and Asia, they have loosened rules regarding attorney advertising,
fees, and nonlawyer involvement in the legal market. Although
approaches differ, with some states pursuing more deregulation
than others, the proclaimed aim has been to increase competition to
better serve consumers at both the high and low ends of the legal
market.2
These decisions culminate over three decades of sociological and
economic critiques of professional self-regulation. Until the 1970s,
social theorists largely accepted that lawyers and other professionals
do not adhere to market logic.3 Instead of pursuing economic gain,
lawyers purportedly serve their clients and the public interest. 4
They do so by “negotiat[ing] the interests of individuals with the

1
“[All professions are] conspiracies against the laity.” BERNARD SHAW, THE
DOCTOR’S DILEMMA, GETTING MARRIED, AND THE SHEWING-UP OF BLANCO POSNET xv
(1906).
2 See discussion infra Part III. For a general survey, see Gillian K. Hadfield,
Legal Markets, J. ECON. LITERATURE (forthcoming 2021); see also Edward Shinnick et
al., Aspects of Regulatory Reform in the Legal Profession: Australia, Ireland and the
Netherlands, 10 INT’L J. LEGAL PRO. 237, 241 (2003) (“In recent times, regulatory
reform has attempted to diminish the power of the professions.”).
3 Eliot Freidson, Theory and the Professions, 64 IND. L. J. 423, 423–24, 429 (1989);
Mike Saks, A Review of Theories of Professions, Organizations and Society: The Case for
Neo-Weberianism, Neo-Institutionalism and Eclecticism, 3 J. PROS. ORGS. 170, 172 (2016)
(examining traditional, “deferential” views of the professions); see also Rebecca
Roiphe, The Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649, 666 (2016) (noting
increasing dominance of claims that professionals “were monopolies or cabals
disguised as something else”).
4
See Saks, supra note 3, at 172 (outlining the functionalist view that
“professions acquire high socio-economic privileges in exchange for employing in
a non-exploitative way esoteric knowledge of great importance to society”). See
generally Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, 17 SOC. FORCES 457, 463
(1939) (“The dominance of a business economy has seemed to justify the view that
ours was an ‘acquisitive society’ . . . . Professional men, on the other hand, have
been thought of as standing above these sordid considerations, devoting their lives
to ‘service’ of their fellow men.”).

2022]

Deregulation and the Lawyers’ Cartel

5

demands of the state.” 5 Lawyers are “collectivity-oriented” 6 and
inculcate shared societal values and check “unbridled capitalism.”7
Under this traditional view of the legal profession, selfregulation affords lawyers the autonomy to fulfill their public
duties. 8 Moreover, since lawyers’ esoteric and specialized
knowledge is generally inaccessible to nonlawyers,9 self-regulation
enables the profession to vouch-safe for its members and establish a
baseline of quality, 10 obviating the eponymous “lemon problem”
whereby unqualified providers of legal services crowd out qualified
ones via adverse selection. 11 As sociologist Everett Hughes has
suggested, “[a] central feature . . . of all professions, is the motto . . .
, credat emptor. Thus is the professional relation distinguished from
that of those markets in which the rule is caveat emptor.”12
A large body of scholarship has challenged the traditional
understanding of the legal profession. Sociologists, while not
necessarily opposed to self-regulation, allege that lawyers have been
more concerned with maintaining status and market control than
serving the public.13 Economists, influenced by public choice theory,
Roiphe, supra note 3, at 652 (citing EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
(1957)).
6
TALCOTT PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 2, 370, 375 (1964).
7
See Roiphe, supra note 3, at 653–54; Parsons, supra note 4, at 467.
8
See Everett C. Hughes, Professions, 92 DAEDALUS 655, 656-657 (1963).
9
See id. at 656–57 (“The client is not a true judge of the value of the services
he receives . . . . Only the professional can say when his colleague makes a
mistake.”).
10
Nuno Garoupa, Providing a Framework for Reforming the Legal Profession:
Insights from the European Experience, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 463, 468 (2008);
Shinnick et al., supra note 2, at 238.
11
Garoupa, supra note 10, at 468. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market
for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)
(describing the effect information asymmetry between buyers and sellers has on the
quality of goods in the market).
12
Hughes, supra note 8, at 657.
13
See W. Wesley Pue, Trajectories of Professionalism?: Legal Professionalism After
Abel, 19 MAN. L.J. 384, 390 (1990) (summarizing critiques); see also Hilary
Sommerlad, Managerialism and the Legal Profession: A New Professional Paradigm, 2
INT’L J. LEGAL PRO. 159, 162 (1995) (“The Weberian account of the rise of the
professions is therefore concerned to demonstrate how these occupational groups
achieved status and privilege not through intrinsic merit . . . but by first constituting
5
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predominately conceive of self-regulation in terms of cartelization
and rent-seeking.14 In the words of Posner:
[T]he history of the legal profession is to a great extent . . . the
history of efforts by all branches of the legal profession . . . to
secure a lustrous place in the financial and social status sun.
And until sometime in the 1960’s, the legal profession in the
United States, as in most other wealthy countries, was
succeeding triumphantly in this endeavor. The profession
was an intricately and ingeniously reticulated, though
imperfect, cartel.15
Despite differences in approach and emphasis, both accounts are
in accord that legal market regulations have predominately served
the legal profession’s interests and that reforms should focus on
diminishing the profession’s power over the market.16 At their core,
these reform agendas are deregulatory because they associate
market liberalization and increased competition with better
outcomes for consumers. 17 Although not all jurisdictions have
deregulated their legal markets, the trend is undeniably away from
professional self-regulation.18

and then controlling a market.”). However, even the traditional view’s most
eminent Neo-Weberian critic has recognized that “[s]elf-regulation is Janus-faced,
serving the interests of both the public and the profession.” Richard L. Abel, Lawyer
Self-Regulation and the Public Interest: A Reflection, 20 LEGAL ETHICS 115, 121 (2017).
14
See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 2, at 35; Anthony Ogus, Rethinking SelfRegulation, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL. STUD. 97, 98–99 (1995); Richard A. Posner, The
Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 INDIANA L.J. 1, 1 (1993).
15
Posner, supra note 14, at 1.
16 See generally Roiphe, supra note 3, at 667 (“The Marxist-Weberian critique of
professionals was oddly consistent with its conservative counterpart. While
entirely distinct in both its tone and conclusions, it shared many of the same
assumptions.”); see also Shinnick et al., supra note 2, at 240 (“When it comes to
proposing alternatives to the status quo, reformers tend to focus on economic
market controls.”).
17 Garoupa, supra note 10, at 464; see also John Flood, The Re-Landscaping of the
Legal Profession: Large Law Firms and Professional Re-Regulation, 59 CURRENT SOCIO.
MONOGRAPH 507, 520 (2011) (noting that the “neoliberal deregulatory agenda . . . is
often at odds with the ethos of professionalism”).
18 See Laura Bugatti, Towards a New Era for the Legal Profession, 1 EUR. REV. PRIV.
L. 83, 92–93 (2019); see also Nuno Garoupa, Globalization and Deregulation of Legal
Services, 38 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 1-2 (2013) (contrasting the EU and UK to individual
countries such as Spain).
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Early clashes focused on advertising. In the United States and
England, lawyers could not advertise until the 1970s and 80s.19 The
legal profession regarded attorney advertising as inherently
misleading because of the individualized nature of legal services
and consumers’ lack of understanding of legal needs. 20 However,
deregulation advocates argued that advertising would increase
competition, lower prices, and facilitate access to legal services.21
These arguments carried the day in the United States and
England. Under pressure from courts and regulators, the American
and English legal professions liberalized their advertising rules. 22
Other European countries have since followed suit.23 Yet, decades
later, the evidence is still mixed as to whether the loosening of
advertising rules affected the cost and accessibility of legal
services.24
Contemporary debates over attorney regulation focus largely on
nonlawyer involvement in the legal market. Several European and
Asian countries allow alternative business structures (“ABS”)—
19 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371–72 (1970) (noting that
prohibition against advertising was originally a “rule of etiquette”). See generally
John B. Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England and the United States, 32 AM. J.
COMPAR. L. 493, 502–03 (1984) (tracing informal bans to the 1700s and formal ones
to the early 1900s).
20 Bates, 433 U.S. at 372–73; see also Bugatti, supra note 18, at 101 (noting that
restrictions among EU member states “have usually been justified by recalling the
information asymmetry between lawyers and clients (the latter possessing not
enough information to assess legal services’ claims)”).
21
Terry Calvani et al., Attorney Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 761, 776–77 (1988); Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should be
Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1107–
08 (1983); see also Attanasio, supra note 19, at 499 (noting that the advertising ban in
the United Kingdom “deprived the public and potential entrants of information
about solicitors and deterred competition, efficiency, and innovation”).
22 Bates, 433 U.S. at 376; Attanasio, supra note 19, at 500–02.
23 See Bugatti, supra note 18, at 100–01 (noting a recent deregulatory trend in
European Union member states such as Italy, France, and Spain).
24
See Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, The Regulation of Quality in the
Market for Legal Services: Taking the Heterogeneity of Legal Services Seriously, 10 EUR. J.
COMPAR. ECON. 267, 277 (2013); see also Michael P. Stone & Thomas J. Miceli, Optimal
Attorney Advertising, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 329, 333 (2012) (summarizing research
in the field). One of the chief difficulties is that some segments of the profession
advertise far more than others. For example, in the United States, much attorney
advertising is from personal injury attorneys. See Nora Freeman Engstrom,
Attorney Advertising and the Contingency Fee Cost Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. 633, 638–
40 (2013) (finding that attorney advertising does not drive down contingent fees).
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economic entities not wholly-owned and operated by lawyers that
provide legal services. 25 The American legal profession has on
numerous occasions rejected ABS. 26 In the vast majority of states,
lawyers cannot share fees with nonlawyers or form business
associations with them.27
However, opposition to ABS may be receding. The District of
Columbia allows a limited form of nonlawyer ownership, and Utah
and Arizona recently amended attorney regulations to allow for
nonlawyer ownership of law firms as well. 28 The latter two
jurisdictions were greatly influenced by the work of proderegulation scholars who extolled the benefits of ABS in the UK
context especially.29 These scholars have been forthright in that they
see the legal services market as no different than other markets. As
25
Richard Devlin & Ora Morison, Access to Justice and the Ethics and Politics of
Alternative Business Structures, 91 CAN. BAR REV. 483, 485 (2012); Judith A.
McMorrow, UK Alternative Business Structures for Legal Practice: Emerging Models and
Lessons for the US, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665, 667 (2016); Edward M. Iacobucci & Michael
J. Trebilcock, An Economic Analysis of Alternative Business Structures for the Practice of
Law, 92 CAN. BAR REV. 57, 58 (2013).
26
For a history of the American debate on nonlawyer ownership, see Jayne R.
Reardon, Alternative Business Structures: Good for the Public, Good for the Lawyers, 7
ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 304, 309–13 (2017); Paul D. Paton,
Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP
Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2193 (2010) (noting that proposed
reforms were rejected “with a vengeance” in 2000).
27 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
28 Dan Packel, Arizona’s Ownership Rules Have Major Implications for Consumer
Law, the Big Four, Lit Funders and More, LAW.COM (Sept. 1, 2020, 4:05 PM),
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2020/09/01/arizonas-ownership-ruleshave-major-implications-for-consumer-law-the-big-four-lit-funders-and-more/;
Debra Cassens Weiss, DC Bar Considers Relaxing Its Already-Lenient Rules to Allow
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, ABA J. (Jan. 27, 2020, 10:40 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/dc-bar-considers-relaxing-itsalready-lenient-rules-to-allow-nonlawyer-ownership-of-law-firms
[https://perma.cc/Q6MS-QMQV].
29 Gillian K. Hadfield, More Markets, More Justice, 148 DAEDALUS 37, 42 (2019)
[hereinafter Hadfield, More Markets]; Gillian K. Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How
to Regulate Legal Services to Promote Access, Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering,
67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1212 (2016); Thomas D. Morgan, The Rise of Institutional Law
Practice, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005, 1023–24 (2012); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big
Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 760–71 (2010). For Professor Hadfield’s influence in
particular, see Lyle Moran, How Utah’s Judicial and State Bar Officials Worked Together
for
Regulatory
Reform,
ABA
J.
(Nov.
5,
2020,
9:05
AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/how-utahs-judicial-and-state-barofficials-worked-together-for-regulatory-reform [https://perma.cc/XQC3-9VYM].
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Hadfield has written, “[a] more efficient market for legal services
requires changing the rules of professional practice to allow
businesses that—like all other service businesses in our economy—
are owned, managed, and financed by people other than the
specialists who are providing services to clients to compete.”30
On the consumer end of the legal market, ABS, through
branding and economies of scale, are supposed to make legal
services more accessible;31 on the corporate side of the legal market,
ABS are allegedly more efficient and innovative than traditional
firms because they can leverage nonlawyer expertise.32
We take no position on whether the United States and other
holdout jurisdictions should embrace ABS and other deregulatory
reforms. Indeed, even among jurisdictions that allow for ABS,
approaches vary. Whereas England does not place limits on ABS
nonlawyer ownership, many other jurisdictions do place limits to
safeguard attorney independence. 33 For example, Spain allows
twenty-five percent nonlawyer ownership whereas countries such
as Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden allow only ten percent. 34
Jurisdictions also vary widely in the insularity of their legal markets

Hadfield, More Markets, supra note 29, at 46.
See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through
the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 43 (2014); Ribstein,
supra note 29, at 799–800 (“An established retailer can leverage its brand by
extending the firm’s scope to embrace a different type of service.”).
32
One noted commentator claimed that “the ability of law firms in London to
structure arrangements and ventures with non-lawyers will give those firms
individually, and the English legal profession collectively, a hitherto unimaginable
competitive advantage.” Anthony E. Davis, Regulation of the Legal Profession in the
United States and the Future of Global Law Practice, 19 PRO. LAW. 1, 9 (2009); see also
Ribstein, supra note 29, at 797 (“[T]he stand-alone law firm ignores potential
synergies between legal advice and other activities which might not be fully
realized by arm’s-length contracts among clients, lawyers, and other serviceproviders. Thus, it may be more efficient for firms to combine legal services with
other activities under common ownership.”).
33
See generally Bugatti, supra note 18, at 104–05 (“Even in those jurisdictions
where ABSs have received full legal recognition, it is not surprising to find some
restriction (e.g. concerning the percentage of non-lawyer ownership interest), in
order to ensure that lawyers’ professional obligations are met.”).
34
Id. at 103; Louise Lark Hill, Alternative Business Structures for Lawyers and
Law Firms: A View from the Global Legal Services Market, 18 OR. INT’L L. REV. 135, 183
(2017).
30
31
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as well as the likelihood that incumbent firms will be able to draw
substantial nonlawyer investment.35
We view the push for ABS as only the latest outgrowth of a
deregulatory legal market discourse, whose own theoretical and
empirical premises have heretofore received minimal scrutiny.
Although arguments against professional self-regulation have
proven persuasive to many regulatory bodies, we contend that
prevailing economic approaches to the legal market are theoretically
incomplete because they fail to account fully for segmentation and
the different positions of clients in the corporate and consumer
spheres of the markets. 36 Pro-deregulation scholars have also
overestimated the impact of ABS and other deregulatory reforms in
select jurisdictions while overlooking other jurisdictions’
experiences. In our view, the lesson from decades of deregulation is
ultimately one of inertia: despite various top-down reforms, little
has fundamentally changed. To make legal markets more efficient,
regulators should instead consider targeted interventions that do
not necessarily fit within the competition paradigm.
Part II of this Article sets out the bases for regulating legal
markets, focusing on information asymmetries, negative
externalities, positive externalities, and the promotion of
competition. Part III focuses on deregulation scholars’ critique of
professional self-regulation. This critique, grounded in public
choice theory, has led to deregulation in the areas of entry barriers,
fees, advertising, professional standards, and most recently
organizational forms. Nevertheless, the deregulatory critique
accepts many of the premises of professional self-regulation and
does not fully address the problem of market segmentation. Clients
at the high end of the legal market have long been able to dictate
terms to law firms and ignore or contract around regulations that
they view as overly costly and burdensome.
Conversely,
information asymmetries prevent ordinary consumers from
Iacobucci & Trebilcock, supra note 25, at 81–82.
Legal profession scholarship has divided legal practice into two
hemispheres since the iconic Chicago Lawyers Study. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD
O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 10–13 (1982).
We follow this general path by dividing the legal market into two segments, 1) a
corporate segment characterized by repeat players and sophisticated users of legal
services and 2) a consumer segment that features less sophisticated clients and
infrequent purchasers of legal services who need personal assistance. See id. at 319.
35
36
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appreciating the need for legal assistance and utilizing low-cost
services even where available. Altering the pool of available legal
service providers does not fundamentally alter these dynamics and
may exacerbate negative externalities from legal assistance. Part IV
supports this theoretical account with evidence from the United
States, United Kingdom, and European Union. The effects of
regulatory reforms have been modest in most jurisdictions, and
greater efficiencies in legal markets have been driven largely by
technological developments that appear in heavily regulated and
less regulated markets alike. The pro-competitive effects of ABS in
particular are lacking in most jurisdictions. Part V suggests that
regulatory reforms would be more effective if they focused on
negative externalities at the high end of the market and overcoming
information asymmetries at the low end of the market. We conclude
by proposing reforms that could facilitate ordinary consumers’
interactions with the legal system.
II. THEORIES OF LEGAL MARKET REGULATION
a. The Case for Legal Market Regulation
The classical economics view is that regulation pursues the
public interest when regulation corrects for market failures.37 The
main market failure that applies to professional legal markets is
information asymmetry. 38 Specifically, for most clients or

37
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 6 (1971); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J.
POL. ECON. 807, 808 (1975); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213 (1976); P. Göran T. Hägg, Theories on the
Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective, 4 EUR.
J.L. & ECON. 337, 339 (1997).
38
Robert Dingwall & Paul Fenn, “A Respectable Profession”? Sociological and
Economic Perspectives on the Regulation of Professional Services, 7 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
51, 52 (1987); Frank H. Stephen & James H. Love, Regulation of the Legal Profession,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 989 (1999).
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consumers, professional legal services are credence goods. 39 The
explanation is typically the following: a standard consumer is less
informed about the nature and quality of the service and must rely
on the expertise of the professional lawyer both to assess (the socalled “agency function”) and implement the adequate strategy
(known as the “service function”).40 Because of the dependence of
the consumer on the lawyer, the market for professional legal
services will fail to produce the socially optimal quantity and quality
of legal services. Some protection for the standard consumer of
professional legal services is necessary to guarantee quality and
mitigate inefficiencies. Protection of legal consumers frequently
takes the form of regulation of the legal profession, which is
specifically the supply side of the professional legal services market.
However, asymmetry of information between demand and
supply sides is not the only market failure that economists see in the
legal services market. The overall quality of the legal system is
positively related to the quality of lawyers.41 The consequences of
poor representation, for instance, go beyond the direct client and
generate serious negative externalities to the public. For example, a
poorly drafted will may have to be litigated, consuming scarce
judicial resources. 42 Regulation is justified because the regulatory
body will have more information and expertise at judging quality,
thereby reducing the negative externality caused by bad lawyering.
The converse is also true—regulation can create positive
externalities by improving the quality of the justice system via the
lawyers that staff and represent that system.43
39
Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1973); Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On
Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 5, 7 (2006); see also Garoupa, supra note 10, at 468.
40
Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J. ECON.
107, 107 (1997).
41 See generally Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing
the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 807, 807-809 (1994) (“[T]he law is driven by the
preferences of attorneys.”).
42 See, e.g., Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, Settlement
Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 517 (2003).
43
See generally William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation: A Positive
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 712 (2006)
(“[L]itigation can be conceptualized as a public good, its pursuit produces positive
externalities.”).
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The regulation of legal services can also limit competition in the
professional legal services market.
Consequently, alongside
asymmetry of information and negative externality, there is another
source of potential deadweight loss—lack of perfect competition.
Lack of perfect competition is a market failure that is either intrinsic
to the market for legal services or a regulation failure, a loss imposed
by regulation. The public choice literature generally refers to the
latter as “government failure[.]”44
In the next four subsections, we discuss in detail each of these
issues—asymmetry of information, negative externality, positive
externality, and lack of perfect competition.
i.

Asymmetry of Information

The market failure created by asymmetry of information can
take different forms. The most immediate is supplier-induced
demand, which is the suboptimal consumption of professional legal
services due to opportunism by lawyers. 45 For example, lawyers
may use advertising to “stir up” frivolous litigation.46 This is one of
the main types of moral hazard associated with legal markets.47 In
addition, because consumers cannot judge the quality of lawyers,
the eponymous “lemons problem” may arise and create the need for
some kind of licensing or an equivalent mechanism to protect the
public.48 Increased competition among lawyers does not solve the
lemons problem because bad lawyers drive good lawyers out of the

44 Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUDIES 101, 102 (1987).
45
The classical example is excessive litigation induced by lawyers. See Juan
S. Mora-Sanguinetti & Nuno Garoupa, Do Lawyers Induce Litigation? Evidence from
Spain, 2001-2010, 44 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 29, 38–39 (2015); Samantha Bielen & Wim
Marneffe, Testing the Lawyer-Induced Litigation Hypothesis in Europe, 50 APPLIED
ECON. 1837, 1837 (2018).
46
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1970).
47
For a general discussion of moral hazard and the legal profession, see
Stephen & Love, supra note 38, at 990–91.
48
Hayne E. Leland, Quack, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality
Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1329 (1979).
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market via adverse selection since the market fails to respond to
quality.49
Under this line of reasoning, professional regulation can
improve the market equilibrium. Asymmetric information causes
moral hazard and adverse selection, precluding an efficient level of
services in the market; therefore, regulation should focus on
decreasing search costs, improving service quality, and ensuring
that the public can differentiate between high- and low-quality
providers.50
There are, to be sure, possible arguments against regulating
lawyers with respect to asymmetric information. For example, one
argument is that the costs generated by asymmetry of information
must be balanced against the benefits of labor specialization (i.e.,
lawyers tendency to concentrate on certain areas of the law). 51 A
reduction in information asymmetry might not be efficient if there
is less labor specialization in the legal services market. 52 Another
argument is that asymmetry of information could be addressed by
malpractice insurance.53 If insurance is available and adequate, the
costs generated by asymmetry of information are much less relevant
than argued and do not justify regulation. 54 Finally, there is the
question of heterogeneity of legal services. The degree of
asymmetric information varies across specific tasks and is likely to
be most acute in settings involving low-information clients.
Therefore, there may be tasks performed by the legal profession that
do not beg for any type of regulation since market discipline will be

49
Possibly there is asymmetric information about facts that goes in the
opposite direction: the client (as injured party) knows more about the events than
the attorney. This could explain certain doctrines in the common law (such as the
maintenance and champerty doctrines) precluding lawyers from acquiring the right
to award from their client. At the same time, lawyers can diversify their portfolio
of cases to minimize the impact of asymmetric information about facts. Therefore,
bilateral moral hazard or bilateral adverse selection have not been a major concern.
50 Garoupa, supra note 10, at 469.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 468.
53 Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Nicole Urban, Including Public Interest in Theories of
Regulation, 11 RSCH. L. & ECON. 1, 4-5 (1988).
54
Id. at 5. For a comparative analysis of jurisdictions’ approaches to
malpractice insurance, see Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyers’ Professional Liability:
Comparative Perspectives, 24 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 73, 79-82 (2017).
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enough to achieve an efficient outcome in the presence of localized
asymmetric information.55
ii.

Negative Externalities

Bad lawyering decreases the overall quality of the legal system.56
However, regulators should be concerned with negative
externalities for other reasons as well. For example, consumers in
the market for professional legal services are characterized by
bounded rationality or rational ignorance.57 Clients sometimes use
simplified rules to process information rather than engage in
complex analysis.
They may also lack the education or
sophistication to be able to understand all available information on
legal services and could make choices that can interfere with the
legal system’s operations.
In this context, one can consider the public good nature of
information about professional legal services.
Information
concerning the quality of professional legal services satisfies the
conditions of non-rivalry and non-exclusivity in consumption. 58
Therefore, there is the possibility that private provision by
unregulated legal professionals of information is not efficient,
creating negative externalities. 59 A prominent example from the
legal ethics literature is the provision of legal advice by notarios,
unlicensed providers on whom some immigrants rely with
Chaserant & Harnay, supra note 24, at 267.
See David McGowan, Some Realism about Parochialism: The Economic Analysis
of Legal Ethics 120-122 (Univ. San Diego L. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-20, 2005)
(“[T]he negative consequences of a lawyer’s actions are not confined to the costs
imposed on the lawyer’s direct victims. When a lawyer violates the code of ethics,
every member of the public suffers harm—even those who have no contact with
the unethical lawyer in question.” (quoting RANDAL N. GRAHAM, LEGAL ETHICS:
THEORIES, CASES, AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 205–06 (2004))).
57
Garoupa, supra note 10, at 469.
58
Id. Consuming information concerning the quality of professional legal
services does not exclude other people from consuming the same information (nonrivalry in consumption) and may be difficult to impose prices to access such
information (non-exclusivity), for example, because information is freely available
on the internet.
59
Randall G. Holcombe, A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods, 10 REV.
AUSTRIAN ECON. 1, 1 (1997).
55
56
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devasting consequences. 60 Mandatory disclosure of information
with respect to professional quality (such as date of admission)
should help to avoid this problem. Mandatory disclosure of ethical
discipline also serves the same purpose and warns the public of
unscrupulous providers who may provide deficient services or
provide services under circumstances that undermines public
welfare.61
iii. Positive Externalities
So far, we have considered the possibility of negative
externalities. However, it is possible that legal market regulation
fulfills other goals apart from efficiency. These goals are usually
communitarian in nature.62 They are largely independent of market
considerations but are still relevant from an economic perspective.
Consider a lawyer in a small community. He or she may have a
socially valuable role or function that goes beyond the professional
service he or she provides. Redistribution from the client to the
lawyer rewards the lawyer for these beneficial social services.
Confidence, honesty, and trust might be values pursued by the
government through individual attorneys, which in turn may
promote greater social welfare.63 The social willingness to pay for
60
See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the
Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 8 (2008) (“‘[N]otarios’ charge immigrants
for their services in filing documents and preparing applicants for relief and
benefits, but often lead the immigrants astray with incorrect information and
terrible advice with lasting, damaging consequences that can fatally prejudice what
otherwise would be a proper claim to entry.”); Anne E. Langford, What’s in a Name?:
Notarios in the United States and the Exploitation of a Vulnerable Latino Immigrant
Population, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 115, 116 (2004).
61
See generally Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A
Comparative Analysis of Process and Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PRO. 209, 212 (2011)
(describing the public nature of attorney discipline in the United States).
62
ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 218–19
(1994).
63
See generally Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin
at Home”: The Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1207, 1212 (2009) (“[L]awyer’s civic obligation is expressed in the manner in which
the lawyer conducts everyday private practice and includes an obligation to convey
to clients the lawyer’s understanding of proper civic conduct. We call this the idea
of the lawyer as ‘civics teacher.’”).
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these values may be above its market or economic value, justifying
governmental intervention. The objection to this sort of non-market
failure argument is that regulation benefits lawyers who do not
provide such socially valuable roles. A lawyer in a larger
community where he or she does not provide such social services
enjoys the same extra profits due to regulation as a lawyer in a small
town, maybe even more.64
Another example is lawmaking. Since lawyers are regulated
strictly, they are incentivized to participate in lawmaking and law
reform to maximize the value of their law licenses. 65 State
competition also gives lawyers an incentive to favor welfaremaximizing state laws that make their states attractive as a location
for businesses and as a forum for litigation.66 The objection to this
specific example is that not all legal demand is homogenous and
movable, meaning that jurisdictional competition for lawyers can be
easily distorted by local transaction costs.
iv. Lack of Competition
Thus far, we have focused predominately on traditional
rationales for legal market regulation. Increasingly, regulators have
also become concerned with private interest, capture, and collusion
in the legal market and have sought to deregulate the market to
promote greater competition.67 From this perspective, legal market
regulations have largely served the interests of the members of the
legal profession and have allowed for cartel-like behavior. 68 The
capture theory predicts that professional regulation decreases the
64
There is, of course, a more substantive objection—it is hard to see why
consumers of professional legal services should abstain from revealing their
willingness to pay for those social services in a more competitive market.
65 See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers As Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer
Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 301 (2004) (describing how the law firm business
model affects lawyers’ role in society).
66 Id.
67 Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335, 335
(1974); Garoupa, supra note 18, at 80; Hadfield, supra note 2, at 34.
68
Lee Benham & Alexandra Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A
Perspective on Information Control, 18 J.L. & ECON. 421, 423 (1975); Posner, supra note
14, at 1.
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supply of lawyers below social optimum, increases the prices
charged by lawyers, and ensures that incumbent lawyers’ incomes
are beyond marginal productivity, thereby generating rents and
quasi-rents. 69 The fact that rent-seeking behavior is intrinsically
difficult to identify—particularly when there are plausible public
interest arguments for regulatory intervention—makes rent-seeking
and regulatory capture more likely.
Of course, lack of competition could be a function of the nature
of legal services market as opposed to capture. The oftenoverlooked distinction between asymmetric information and
imperfect information is salient here. The problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard presuppose that the set of information
about the law that a reasonable client possesses is smaller than that
of a lawyer because, inter alia, a lawyer is familiar with the law while
a standard client is not; in economic terms, the client is a principal
and the lawyer is an agent.70 The economic literature on lawyering
is, thus, only part of a vast literature on the principal-agent model.71
In this context, the emphasis by economists on the asymmetric
information between principal (client) and agent (lawyer) has
underplayed the role of imperfect information, which creates a
different kind of deadweight loss. Asymmetric and imperfect
information are distinct concepts that characterize the market for
legal services. 72 Imperfect information exists when an individual
69
Capture theory “describes actors in the regulatory process as having
narrow, self-interested goals—principally job retention or the pursuit of reelection,
self-gratification from the exercise of power, or perhaps post-officeholding personal
wealth.” Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L., ECON. & ORGS. 167, 169
(1990); see also Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 982-83 (2000) (describing various
types of rent-seeking by lawyers).
70 See generally Stephen & Love, supra note 38, at 989–90 (“The particular
market failure that applies to professional markets in general, and the markets for
legal services in particular, is that of information asymmetry . . . Thus there is a
potentially severe principal-agent problem . . . .”).
71
See generally Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and
Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 58–59 (1989) (“[A]gency theory (a) offers unique
insight into information systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and risk and (b)
is an empirically valid perspective . . . .”)
72 George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 220 (1961);
see also Chaserant & Hernay, supra note 24, at 278 (“Inefficient regulation may result
from imperfect information.”).
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does not have all the information necessary to make the most
informed decision. 73 In other words, the agent (lawyer) has more
information than the principal (client) but not all the information
necessary to make the most informed decision. However, the
implications in terms of deadweight loss are different.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that asymmetric
information can be addressed at zero cost and therefore disappears.
The standard public interest theory collapses for obvious reasons—
if there is no asymmetric information, the legal profession cannot
take advantage of clients and there is no clear reason to regulate the
market for legal services. In fact, absent any additional negative
externalities, existing regulation would be purely justified by
capture, hence the need for deregulatory policies to address
excessive pricing and curtail monopoly threats. Once asymmetric
information and negative externality are put aside, the traditional
economic concern is purely driven by market structure, that is, the
extent to which the supply side (lawyers) can exercise market power
to enhance producer surplus at the expense of consumer surplus
(clients). 74
However, the elimination of asymmetric information does not
address the possibility of imperfect information. Both client and
lawyer can have the same information about the law, but that
information may not correspond to reality because legislators,
regulators, and courts are not fully transparent and are not entirely
73
In a systematic way, there are three possible characterizations. A world of
perfect (and necessarily symmetric) information where all individuals have the
same information set which includes all relevant information necessary to make the
most informed decision. This is the traditional neoclassical model in economics.
See E. Roy Weintraub, Neoclassical Economics, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html
(last visited May 24, 2021) [https://perma.cc/25CV-MUAR]. Then we can have a
world of imperfect but symmetric information where all individuals have the same
information set but this information set does not include all relevant information
necessary to make the most informed decision. This is the scenario we want to
explore in this subsection aiming at highlighting the role of imperfect information
per se. Finally, we have a world of imperfect and asymmetric information where
individuals have different information sets and these sets, at least for most
individuals, do not include all relevant information necessary to make the most
informed decision. This is the traditional context of principal-agent models
explored in previous subsections. See Eisenhardt, supra note 71, at 58.
74
KEITH HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 1 (2003).
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bound by their precedents. 75 Under imperfect information, client
and lawyer can jointly err and make decisions that are suboptimal.
They would make better decisions if they had perfect information.
The economic question is no longer primarily about incentives and
expropriation of rents as in a principal-agent setting, but allocation
of losses from suboptimal behavior. Imperfect information leads to
inefficient decisions and deadweight loss. The only remaining issue
is the allocation of loss between lawyer and client. Therefore,
imperfect information is an alternative explanation for a less
competitive market structure. As Schwartz and Wilde have
observed, “the relevant market structure with imperfect information
is not perfect competition but rather monopolistic competition.”76
III. PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION AND ITS CRITICS
a. Arguments for and Against Self-Regulation
The case for regulating lawyers from a public interest
perspective primarily stems from asymmetric information,
externality, and the possible lack of appropriate competition caused
by the nature of legal services. The case for deregulation rests on the
capture theory that predicts that cartel-like behavior will hinder
market competition through excessive regulation. While these
theories oppose one another, they share certain assumptions about
professional regulation.
Let us start with the traditional argument for regulation.
Regulation could simply mean quality regulation, certification, and
75
This is explained by the principal-agent model of lawmaking developed in
the Public Choice literature. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW &
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and
Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 355, 356–57 (1999). Critical theorists describe the
problem as one of indeterminacy. See generally Joseph McCahery, Modernist and
Postmodernist Perspectives on Public Law in British Critical Legal Studies, 2 SOC. &
LEGAL STUD. 397, 399 (1993) (“[Critical] theorists concentrate on legal doctrine and
its indeterminacy in order to reveal the imperfect foundations of the decisionmaking sphere of the welfare state and government’s authority generally.”).
76
Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information, Monopolistic
Competition, and Public Policy, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 18 (1982) (quoting Steve Salop,
Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 240 (1976)).
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licensing to address adverse selection and moral hazard. The
government could subsidize high-quality lawyers to ensure that
they remain in the market even if adverse selection persists. 77
Unfortunately, this does not guarantee a supply of high quality legal
services because of moral hazard on the part of attorneys. 78
Alternatively, jurisdictions could impose penalties on low quality
lawyers and greatly restrict their entry and re-entry in the market.
These regulations, however, require a regulatory agency that must
avoid capture and be able to do what consumers allegedly cannot:
assess quality and signal it to potential clients.79
More generally, under both certification and licensing, a state
bestows a document (e.g., a certificate or license) to an individual
who satisfies certain conditions.
These conditions may be
mandatory education or training that addresses adverse selection ex
ante and moral hazard ex post. The government as well as private
agencies may certify or license professionals, and impose
educational and training requirements.
There are key differences between licensing and self-regulation.
Public authorities issue rules in both scenarios since the professional
body is entrusted with public authority. However, the state
regulates entry and performance in the first case or delegates these
functions to a private agency independent from the profession
whereas the legal profession self-regulates in the second case. The
consequence is that self-regulation promotes strong professional
legal associations and socialization among members whereas
licensing does not.80
The three standard economic arguments against licensing and
for self-regulation are the following: 1) Licensing does not solve the
problem of asymmetric information because neither the government
nor a private agency independent from the legal profession can
77 See Boyan Jovanovic, Favorable Selection with Asymmetric Information, 97 Q.J.
ECON. 535, 538 (1982) (describing subsidies and taxes as solutions to adverse
selection).
78
For a powerful demonstration in the context of public defense, see Amanda
Agan et al., Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of
Criminal Defense, 103 REV. ECON & STATS. 294 (2021).
79
Stephen & Love, supra note 38, at 990.
80
See generally Elizabeth H. Gorman, Professional Self-Regulation in North
America: The Cases of Law and Accounting, 8 SOCIO. COMPASS 491, 492 (2014)
(describing relationship between professional self-regulation and socialization and
control of members).
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better assess the quality of the services than the legal profession itself
(though they might have better knowledge than the average
consumer); 81 2) licensing does not generate the incentives for the
legal profession to invest in collective reputation that sustains high
quality legal services; 82 and 3) licensing is less flexible, which is
problematic in dynamic markets where innovation generates costs
that burden the government rather than the legal profession itself.83
The competition paradigm concedes that lawyers have the
necessary information to produce quality signals in markets for
credence goods while suggesting that the problem of regulatory
capture cannot be avoided because of the desire for rent-seeking.84
Specifically, lawyers may not pass their better information and
expertise to the clients or consumers, increasing search costs for the
consumers.85 Control and enforcement of quality standards will be
ineffective due to collusion within the profession and with
regulators, and fees will be set above marginal productivity and
with a considerable premium. 86
There are important and immediate rejoinders to the
deregulation argument. First, one can develop safeguards to ensure
Chaserant & Harnay, supra note 24 at 278.
Id.
83
The third argument nevertheless has serious limitations. First, lawyers can
easily regulate fees to cover these costs; hence, they will be borne by taxpayers or
consumers in both cases anyway. Second, rents created by the exercise of
regulatory powers by the professional body can undermine flexibility too. For
example, rents may be used to successfully resist competition from other
(international) regulatory bodies offering more efficient rules. See, e.g., James C.
Miller III, The FTC and Voluntary Standards: Maximizing the Net Benefits of SelfRegulation, 4 CATO J., 897, 899 (1985); Christopher Curran, The American Experience
with Self-Regulation in the Medical and Legal Professions, in MICHAEL FAURE ET AL.,
REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS 52, 52–53 (1993). For an alternative view, see Peter
Grajzl & Peter Murrell, Lawyers and Politicians: The Impact of Organized Legal
Professions on Institutional Reforms, 17 CONST. POL. ECON. 251, 253 (2006); Peter Grajzl
& Peter Murrell, Allocating Lawmaking Powers: Self-Regulation vs. Government
Regulation, 35 J. COMPAR. ECON. 520, 520 (2007).
84 See Javier Núñez, A Model of Self-Regulation, 74 ECON. LETTERS 91, 92 (2001);
see also McGowan, supra note 56, at 120 (“No doubt some consumers avoid some
losses from [attorneys] and we can count the avoided losses as consumer gains. But
economic analysis demands more than that.”).
85 McGowan, supra note 56, at 126.
86 See McGowan, supra note 56, at 120 (“To justify on consumer protection
grounds a barrier to entry such as licensing, one would want to know whether
protection could be achieved through less expensive means, and whether the
consumer gains from licensing are larger than the increased fees.”).
81
82
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that the legal profession does not operate as a cartel by designating
various watchdogs. 87 Second, self-regulation lowers information
costs and may more than compensate for potential losses from
cartel-like behavior. 88 In fact, there are ways to mitigate potential
losses caused by cartel-like behavior, such as by having professional
bodies compete with one another as part of a large and
heterogeneous profession and establishing and investing in efficient
licensing systems for these bodies.89 Pro-deregulation scholars have
generally downplayed these possibilities.90
Nevertheless, the economic deregulation literature has proven
persuasive to regulators since the early 2000s. 91 The available
literature has convinced regulators that competition can generate
quality signals and remove informational barriers in legal markets,
thereby addressing public interest concerns without risking
capture. 92 According to this view, appropriate liability rules can
substitute for professional self-regulation and avoid the problem of
cartelization such that the legal market will be more efficient and
better serve the public.93 We assess the main deregulatory initiatives
below.
87
In jurisdictions like the United States, courts primarily serve this function
whereas law societies serve this function in Canada. See Gorman, supra note 80, at
499.
88
Ogus, supra note 14, at 97–98.
89
Avner Shaked & John Sutton, Imperfect Information, Perceived Quality, and the
Formation of Professional Groups, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 170, 178 (1982).
90
Garoupa, supra note 10, at 473.
91 See Garoupa, supra note 10, at 465–66 (discussing legal scholarship and
regulatory developments among the EU-15 countries in the last twenty years).
92 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON., 615, 616 (1981); Jack L. Carr & G.
Frank Mathewson, Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry, 96 J. POL. ECON. 766, 776
(1988); Roger Van den Bergh & Michael Faure, Self-Regulation of the Professions in
Belgium, 11 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 165, 181 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1105, 1108 (1995).
93
Obviously, there are important objections to the use of litigation as a way
to stimulate effective professional regulation: 1) Consumers do not have the
appropriate information to make a comprehensive analysis as to whether or not
negligent behavior, reckless attitudes, or professional malpractices were exercised;
2) consumers may be opportunistic when making decisions with respect to filing
lawsuits and settling out of court (e.g., nuisance litigation), thus generating too
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b. The Deregulatory Turn
Policymakers sought to deregulate professions in the 2000s and
2010s with the explicit goal of promoting more competition and
better services after a long period of perceived capture by incumbent
professional interests.94 Most recently, in late 2021, the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) identified
competition in professional services (with an important emphasis on
legal professions) as an important priority in setting economic
growth-friendly policies.95
Unlike other services and industries, the regulation of the legal
profession had not been traditionally associated with governmental
intervention, but rather with strong and influential professional
associations.96 The dynamic changed in the 2000s when the theory
of private capture began to prevail over concerns about asymmetric
information and negative externalities. 97 Moreover, due to the
prevalence of capture, the implicit assumption was that jurisdictions
can enhance competition in the market for professional legal
much litigation; 3) litigation may not create the adequate incentives for efficient
levels of professional services since it usually aims at providing compensation; and
4) litigation may fail in achieving efficient risk-sharing.
94
Simon Domberger & Avrom Sherr, The Impact of Competition on Pricing and
Quality of Legal Services, 9 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 41, 41 (1989); Mario Pagliero, What Is
the Objective of Professional Licensing? Evidence from the U.S. Market for Lawyers, 29
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 473, 474 (2011).
95
See Workshop on Regulatory Barriers to Competition in Professional Services,
OECD, https://www.oecd.org/economy/reform/workshop-regulatory-barriers/
[https://perma.cc/9MWP-38KV].
96
Gorman, supra note 80, at 492; Hadfield, supra note 2, at 3.
97
For example, the European Commission, in particular the DirectorateGeneral for Competition, has shown interest in promoting competition in the
market for professional services, thus opening a general discussion on the
regulatory frameworks in the early 2000s. See Stocktaking Exercise on Regulation of
Professional Services, Overview of Regulation in the EU Member States, COM (2003)
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/professional_services/studies/overvi
ew_of_regulation_in_the_eu_professions.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E74-GN5S]; see
also
Conveyancing
Services
Market,
COM
(2007),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/professional_services/studies/studies
.html [https://perma.cc/L6XY-KMGW]; Iain Paterson et al., Regulation of
Professional Services in EU Member States: Classification, Measurement and Evaluation,
SERVICEGAP
(2012),
https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/3255/1/dp19_regulation_professional%20servic
es_paterson_brandl_sellner.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAD2-Q8DS].
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services without generating more asymmetric information or
negative externalities. 98 To promote greater market liberalization,
regulators have focused on entry barriers, advertising, fees,
organizational structures, and professional standards.
i.

Entry Barriers

Entry restrictions exist to assure quality of professional services
but also undermine competition by creating professional monopoly
rights.99 These restrictions, as we have seen, are at the heart of the
deregulation debate.
From the perspective of the public interest, some level of
education and training is necessary because the relationship
between human capital and high-quality services is expected to be
positive; moreover, reliance on self-regulation may increase the
specificity of human capital investments and individual
commitments to the profession.100
However, the entry of low-quality lawyers could also be welfare
improving in certain respects. 101 High entry barriers lower the
overall number of legal services providers, increasing costs and
forcing some consumers to go without legal assistance.102 This line
of reasoning explains why competition concerns have taken
precedence over concerns relating to asymmetric information
(particularly adverse selection and moral hazard issues) and
negative externalities in the policy reforms of the 2000s. Additional
considerations have highlighted the need to promote competition
(or less restrictive entry barriers) given the unequal geographic

See supra Part II.
Reed Olsen et al., Why Do States Regulate Admission to the Bar? Economic
Theories and Empirical Evidence, 14 GEO. MASON UNIV. L. REV. 253, 254 (1991); Mario
Pagliero, Licensing Exam Difficulty and Entry Salaries in the U.S. Market for Lawyers,
48 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELS. 726, 726 (2010).
100
Bairj Donabedian, Self-Regulation and the Enforcement of Professional Codes,
PUB. CHOICE 85, 107–18 (1995).
101
Avner Shaked & John Sutton, The Self-Regulating Profession, 48 REV. ECON.
STUD. 217, 231 (1981).
102
Thomas Gehrig & Peter J. Jost, Quacks, Lemons, and Self-Regulation: A Welfare
Analysis, 7 J. REGUL. ECON. 309, 322–23 (1995).
98
99
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distribution of legal services.103 For example, legal markets tend to
be spatially localized, with most attorneys located in and around
large cities.104 Regulation can create local monopolies if lawyers can
only appear before courts in the local area corresponding to the bar
into which they have been admitted.105
ii.

Advertising

Broadly speaking, restricting attorney advertising can be
justified on the same basis as restrictions on advertising generally.
Advertising is a common method to disseminate information and,
from a social welfare perspective, should be allowed when it is
productive; that is, the advertisement conveys important and
relevant information to consumers concerning legal services. 106
There is no specific reason to suppose that advertising of legal
services should be regulated differently than other experience and
credence goods and services. The traditional counterargument—
that advertising threatens the integrity and ethics of the profession
by commercializing it—is unconvincing.107
However, there are economic arguments against advertising
that rely on the distinction between price and quality advertising.108
When information about price is easier to obtain than information
about quality (which is true for experience and credence goods such
as legal services but not for search goods), increasing the availability
103
In the American context, this critique is often phrased in terms of
increasing legal access in rural and/or underserved areas. See generally Lisa R.
Pruitt et al., Legal Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective on Rural Access to Justice, 13 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 21–22 (2018).
104 See generally id. at 22 (“Despite the immense need for lawyers in rural
America, the number of attorneys practicing in rural areas falls painfully short.
While about 20% of [the United States’] population lives in rural America, only 2%
of our nation’s small law practices are located there.”).
105 See B. Peter Pashigian, Occupational Licensing and the Interstate Mobility of
Professionals, 22 J.L. ECON. 1, 20 (1979); Stephen & Love, supra note 38, at 987.
106 Andrew Stivers & Victor J. Tremblay, Advertising, Search Costs, and Social
Welfare, 17 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 317, 319 (2005).
107 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz, 433 U.S. 350, 372–73 (1970).
108 Stone & Miceli, supra note 24, at 330; Yannick Gabuthy & Eve-Angéline
Lambert, Legal Advertising and Frivolous Lawsuits, 174 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON.
570, 572 (2018).
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of price advertising might discourage quality competition and
encourage price competition, leading to a degradation of the
average quality in the market. 109 Thus some restrictions on
advertising may be justified, although probably not outright bans.
The general position of the deregulation movement is that
restrictions on advertising increase the price of legal services and
that the more advertising exists, the lower the price is.110 However,
several studies challenge this contention. 111 For example, in the
context of personal injury cases, Engstrom has found that personal
injury lawyers who advertise in the United States do not charge less
than their non-advertising counterparts and that fees have not
dropped since the Supreme Court’s revocation of the advertising
ban. 112 Stephen, Love, and Paterson come to a similar conclusion
regarding the removal of advertising prohibitions on conveyancing
fees in England.113 Moreover, quality advertising appears to be far
more common than price advertising, notwithstanding that it is
likely less useful to consumers.114
iii. Fees
At one time, lawyers in most jurisdictions were required to
adhere to minimum fee schedules. 115 Restrictions on fees are one
way to ensure a confidence premium to professionals, but such fee

109
Martin Cave, Market Models and Consumer Protection, 8 J. CONSUMER POL’Y,
335, 339 (1985).
110 See generally James H. Love & Frank H. Stephen, Advertising, Price and
Quality in Self-Regulating Professions: A Survey, 3 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 227, 243 (1996)
(arguing that there is “evidence to suggest that advertising does increase consumer
information and can reduce fees as a result”).
111 See, e.g., John R. Schroeter et al., Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal
Service Markets: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 49 (1987); John A. Rizzo
& Richard J. Zeckhauser, Advertising and the Price, Quantity, and Quality of Primary
Physician Services, 27 J. HUM. RES. 381 (1992).
112
Engstrom, supra note 24, at 667.
113
Frank H. Stephen et al., Deregulation of Conveyancing Markets in England and
Wales, 15 FISCAL STUD. 102, 115-16 (1994).
114
Engstrom, supra note 24, at 682; see also Stephen et al., supra note 113, at 115
(“[P]rice advertising has remained very much an exception.”).
115
Garoupa, supra note 10, at 480.
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restrictions could also undermine price competition. 116 Quite
obviously, recommended fees reflect cartel-like behavior and
redistribute from the public to lawyers. Restrictions on fees could
also undermine quality.117
As few jurisdictions continue to maintain recommended fees,
most of the recent deregulation literature has focused on the
allowance of contingency fees, conditional fees, and other means of
shifting risk from the state to lawyers.118 Such fees are also meant to
enable the provision of legal services to clients who lack the means
to pay for lawyers directly.119
iv. Organizational Structures
Legal markets commonly include some restrictions on
organizational forms. For example, some jurisdictions prohibit legal
service providers from incorporating.120 Even where incorporation
is permitted, jurisdictions might maintain restrictions on
incorporation as well as who may own and operate law firms.121 The

116 Dean Lueck et al., Market and Regulatory Forces in the Pricing of Legal Services,
7 J. REG. ECON. 63, 80 (1995); see also Edward Shinnick & Frank H. Stephen,
Professional Cartels and Scale Fees: Chiseling on the Celtic Fringe?, 20 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 407, 417–18 (2000).
117
See J.A.H. Maks & N.J. Philipsen, An Economic Analysis of the Regulation of
Professions, in REGULATION OF ARCHITECTS IN BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS 11, 26–
28 (Cralls & Vereeck eds., 2005).
118 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubenfeld, Aligning the Interests
of Lawyers and Clients, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 165, 167 (2003); Hugh Gravelle &
Michael Waterson, No Win, No Fee: Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees, 103
ECON. J. 1205, 1205 (1993); see also Lisa Webley, Legal Professional De(Re)Regulation,
Equality, and Inclusion, and the Contested Space of Professionalism Within the Legal
Market in England and Wales, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349, 2355 (2015) (explaining
justification for conditional fees).
119
See generally Winand Emons, Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus
Being Insured by High Contingent Fees, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 20, 22 (“Contingent fees
may be seen as a mechanism to finance cases when the plaintiff is liquidityconstrained[.]”).
120
Garoupa, supra note 10, at 483.
121
Bugatti, supra note 18, at 103.
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usual justification for these restrictions is agency costs. 122 Since
production and quality in the legal services market cannot be judged
by nonlawyers, legal services can be delivered most efficiently by
lawyer specialists operating as solo practitioners or in traditional
partnerships.123
However, it is also possible that banning other organizational
forms denies the legal market the benefits of nonlawyer expertise
and economies of scale and scope. 124 For example, removing all
restrictions on organizational forms would allow consumers to “one
stop shop” for legal services alongside other needed services.125 The
deregulation argument is simply that organizational forms should
respond to market needs and not professional restrictions.126
v.

Professional Standards

The introduction of professional standards and ethics generates
a number of costs, including administrative costs (defining,
monitoring, and enforcing quality), compliance costs (from fulfilling
professional obligations), and opportunity costs (since opportunistic
behavior is restricted).127
Under the capture theory, lawyers are expected to seek to
minimize these costs.128 The maintenance of professional standards
are an effective mechanism to protect insiders from competitors by

122
Garoupa, supra note 10, at 483; see also id. at 104–05 (noting that “[e]ven in
jurisdictions where ABSs have received full recognition, it is not surprising to find
some restriction . . . in order to ensure that lawyers’ professional obligations are
met”).
123
Jack Carr & Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the
Legal Organization of Firms, 33 J. L. ECON. 307, 307 (1990); R.C.O. Matthews, The
Economics of Professional Ethics: Should the Professions Be More Like Business?, 101
ECON. J. 737, 740 (1991).
124
Hadfield, supra note 31, at 44.
125
See Frank H. Stephen, The European Single Market and the Regulation of the
Legal Profession: An Economic Analysis, 23 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 115, 117
(2002).
126
Garoupa, supra note 10, at 483-485.
127
Ogus, supra note 14, at 98.
128
Harald Hau & Marcel Thum, Lawyers, Legislation and Social Welfare, 9 EURO.
J.L. & ECON. 231, 231 (2000).

30

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:4

imposing their own quality standards. 129 Rather than controlling
exits (for failure to comply with quality standards), they are mainly
used to control entry. There are few substitutes to enforce
professional standards since the alternative mechanisms such as
litigation in court still rely heavily on the legal profession. 130
Defenders of professional self-regulation highlight that prevailing
professional standards inculcate shared values as well as impose
heightened duties on lawyers while prohibiting the waiver of
warranties.131
c. Deregulatory Discourse and the Problem of Segmentation
As discussed above, both defenders of professional selfregulation and deregulation scholars acknowledge market failures
in the provision of legal services, namely asymmetric information
between consumers/clients and lawyers. Both sides also agree that
self-regulation could address this market failure but at the risk of
capture. The key point of contention is whether legal market
regulation stems from the concern over market failure or is the
product of capture.132
Those who favor public interest explanations would argue that
addressing market failures should be prioritized over capture
concerns, which can be minimized in various ways, including via
heightened enforcement of professional standards. 133 Those who
favor deregulation suggest that capture and rent appropriation are
too prevalent and if asymmetric information is to exist anyway,
Id.
McGowan, supra note 56, at 126; see also Hadfield, supra note 2, at 5 (“In
Anglo-American jurisdictions, almost all publicly-appointed judges began their
careers as private practitioners and hence have accumulated experience shaped by
their years in private practice.”).
131 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT preamble ¶12; MODEL RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.8, cmt. 17 (“Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer’s liability for
malpractice are prohibited unless the client is independently represented in making
the agreement because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent
representation”); see also Milan Markovic, Book Review: Justice Triage, 29 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 10 (2017) (describing waivers of warranties by legal technology
companies that compete with attorneys).
132
See infra Part II.a.
133
Garoupa, supra note 10, at 471.
129
130
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competition approaches are, at least, second-best and should be
pursued by regulators.134
Although pro-deregulation scholars, many of them economists,
maintain that competition will make the legal market efficient,
economic theory does not necessarily support that conclusion. First,
more competition does not eliminate opportunism by lawyers
because there will still be asymmetric information in the market.
Additional competition does not eliminate existing market failures.
Second, more competition does not reduce imperfect information
which is a function of lack of transparency on the part of legislators,
administrative agencies, and courts, not the nature of the
relationship between client and attorney. Imperfect information is
not generated by a specific market structure, but from the nature of
lawmaking; more competition simply reallocates the losses between
client and attorney without changing the underlying problem. In
this context, deregulation potentially redistributes consumer and
producer surplus without improving market efficiency since the
inefficiencies are not generated only by asymmetric information, but
also by imperfect information.
More generally, the economic literature has recognized that
market failure arguments do not apply to all consumers equally.135
Repeat purchasers in the market for professional legal services such
as corporate clients are able to acquire experience and knowledge of
the market, reducing informational asymmetries. 136 Furthermore,
when the service function is provided separately from the agency
function, there is scope for revelation of information that limits
opportunism. 137 In the corporate segment, informational
asymmetries are near zero because corporations are repeat players,
and in-house counsels monitor and assess the work of their outside
counsel.138 Therefore, as a client’s sophistication increases, the better
able the client is to pay a confidence premium, rewarding

Id.
Id. at 470.
136
Hadfield, supra note 69, at 953–1006.
137
See generally Emons, supra note 40 (comparing conditional and contingent
fees in a principal-agent framework where the lawyer chooses unobservable effort
after she has observed the amount at stake).
138 Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez-Pomar, Cashing by the Hour: Why Large
Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees over Contingent Fees, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 458, 462 (2008).
134
135
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professionals above marginal productivity without the need for
special regulations.
Even when dealing with unsophisticated clients such as
ordinary consumers, a lawyer who handles cases with care and
arranges affairs with success may create a trust relationship with his
or her clients. 139 However, most of these clients are not repeat
purchasers, and even if they were, the costs of mistakes in the initial
rounds could be very high. Smaller businesses and wealthier
individuals arguably occupy a middle ground, having some
experience with legal services and understanding of their utility but
limited capacities to monitor and assess quality.140
One solution could be independent rating agencies designed by
repeat purchasers to perform the agency function on behalf of
infrequent consumers.141 Nevertheless, even assuming that such a
rating agency could be established without jeopardizing other
values such as client confidentiality, 142 the independent rating
agency may be captured by the legal profession, thus shifting
payoffs from infrequent consumers to frequent consumers.
Of equal importance with respect to the consumer segment
specifically is that informational asymmetries are not limited to the
quality of legal services. A large social science literature documents
that consumers largely do not know that they have legal needs.143
According to Sandefur, Americans are able to assess their civil legal
needs as legal in only nine percent of situations. 144 Increasing the
number of suppliers will not lead to an uptick in the use of legal

139 See generally Stephen & Love, supra note 38, at 990 (discussing the “social
institution of trust” and how it “mitigates the moral hazard problem arising from
the information asymmetry [between society and the profession]”).

140

Michael J. Trebilcock, Regulating the Market for Legal Services, 45 ALTA. L.
REV. 215, 218 (2008) (describing informational asymmetries and quality assurance
problems in the legal market’s small client sector).
141 Stephen & Love, supra note 38, at 991.
142 Id.
143 See generally Milan Markovic, Juking Access to Justice to Deregulate the Legal
Market, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 63, 72–73 (2016) (summarizing field studies).
144
REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, A.B.A., ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY
USA: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY 14 (2014),
https://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_a
ccessing_justice_in_the_contemporary_usa._aug._2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q33J-8K6R].
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services if demand does not also increase.145 Indeed, multiplying the
number of providers may be counterproductive inasmuch as it sows
confusion among consumers about where to turn.146
From an economic perspective, there is a clear distinction
between the corporate segment characterized by frequent users of
legal services and the consumer segment characterized by
infrequent users. The corporate segment is not as susceptible to
asymmetric information whereas the consumer segment cannot
assess quality or when legal assistance is needed or valuable. When
these differences are considered, we theorize that the most likely
result from deregulatory reforms is inertia and not transformation.
As to the corporate segment, market failures are less intense and
changes in competition are unlikely to impact attorney-client
relationships. With respect to infrequent consumers, market failures
are likely to be pervasive. Therefore, additional competition will
have a limited impact given that other relevant factors such as
asymmetric information and imperfect information undermine
clients’ access to legal services.
d. Deregulation and Inertia
When regulation exists because of capture by private interests
and not the need to address potential market failures, deregulation
is expected to improve consumer welfare. 147 However, when
regulation exists because there are true market failures, deregulation
harms the welfare of consumers and fails to improve market
performance.148 In the latter case, additional competition can only
generate visible gains in the absence of market failures (or, at least,
145 See Markovic, supra note 143, at 71–72 (questioning conflation of unmet
legal needs with demand for legal services); Jessica Steinberg, Demand Side Reform
in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 787 (2015) (“[A]ccess to justice
advocates have ping-ponged for over a decade between the illusive pursuit of a
fully funded right to counsel and the dilution of attorney resources to the point of
limited efficacy.”).
146 See generally Webley, supra note 118, at 2360 (“The dazzling array of options
open to consumers, the huge knowledge asymmetry in a messy professional arena,
and the lack of consistent regulation make [law] a difficult environment to navigate
successfully for consumers.”).
147
Garoupa, supra note 10, at 473.
148 Id.
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when these market failures are minimized) and if it counteracts
private capture effectively.149
As we have argued, the corporate segment is generally less
exposed to asymmetric information and other market failures.
Therefore, the corporate segment is unlikely to be taken advantage
of by anti-competitive practices, especially in a globalized legal
market. The converse is true—corporate clients and elite law firms
have leverage to negotiate around regulations that they view as
inefficient.150 For example, they can exploit weaknesses in current
regulations or innovate with new legal instruments that address
efficiency concerns. Therefore, enhancing competition in the market
for legal services is unlikely to impact this segment significantly.151
For regulators, the main focus should be market failures that
plague the consumer segment which is characterized by non-repeat
players. These are the consumers more exposed to asymmetric
information and more likely to suffer from anti-competitive
practices and other consequences from capture. However, as shown
by economists, the effects of increased competition are limited when
asymmetric information is pervasive and may in fact exacerbate the
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 152 Therefore,
unless deregulation (with additional competition in the market for
legal services) is coupled with a reduction in asymmetric
information, the impact will be minimal or deleterious. As one of us
has written, “the complex educational, cultural, and psychological
barriers that prevent individuals from accessing legal services
cannot be overcome merely by increasing the number of low-cost
providers.”153
Deregulation and additional competition is neither good nor bad
from an economic perspective. In fact, in the absence of further
Id. at 470–73.
See infra Part IV. Interestingly, some deregulation scholars concede this
point while still maintain that regulation inhibits innovation in the corporate
segment. See Hadfield, supra note 2, at 30, 45 (noting abundant regulatory
workarounds in the corporate segment).
151
Because smaller businesses are less likely to operate in a globalized market
and to extract discounts from attorneys, it is possible that they may reap greater
benefits from deregulation than larger ones.
152
Akerlof, supra note 11, at 493-94; Chaserant & Harnay, supra note 24, at 278
(“Deregulation provides no remedy against market failures, nor prevents
opportunism in an asymmetric information setting.”).
153
Markovic, supra note 131, at 73.
149
150
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reforms, inertia is the most likely outcome. With respect to the
corporate segment, both sides of the market for legal services can
overcome efficiency shortcomings. With respect to the consumer
segment, market failures are not reduced or mitigated by additional
competition. Deregulation and additional competition must be
coupled with policies to address market failures (e.g., information
asymmetry) to produce substantive or visible change.
Consider imperfect information.154 It constrains the relationship
between client and attorney regardless of client sophistication.
Additional competition does not address the underlying problem—
opacity.155 As described above, imperfect information is not caused
by market disadvantages, but rather because legislators, regulators,
and courts are not always transparent and not entirely bound by
their precedents. Enhancing competition does not address the
problem directly and therefore we can only expect that additional
competition matters to reduce imperfect information in a very
marginal way. 156 Thus, while we do not deny that some
deregulation could be beneficial in markets with limited
competition, the market for corporate legal services is highly
competitive in most jurisdictions, the deregulation paradigm does
little to address the information asymmetries that plague the
consumer segment, and the problem of imperfect information
further complicates reform efforts. Part IV tests our theory by
examining deregulatory reforms undertaken outside of the United
States.

154
See generally Schwartz, supra note 76 (discussing the economic theory that
imperfect information results in markets closer to monopolistic competition models
than perfect competition).
155
See generally David Dranove & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Monopolistic
Competition When Price and Quality Are Imperfectly Observable, 23 RAND J. ECON. 518
(1992) (explaining that improvements in price and/or quality information can
perversely decrease welfare when price competition is so intense relative to quality
competition that firms elect suboptimal levels of quality).
156 Id.
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IV. DEREGULATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: EXPERIENCES
ABROAD
a. The United Kingdom Legal Services Act157
The United Kingdom legal market was once characterized by a
great degree of professional autonomy. 158 Barristers and solicitors
were “little republics” and thought to be immune from state
interference. 159 Although barristers and solicitors contested the
scopes of their respective domains, they did not compete with nonlawyer providers until the late 1980s when the United Kingdom
began licensing professional conveyancers.160 Nevertheless, lawyers
practicing as solo practitioners or in professional partnerships
continued to dominate the legal market.161
The profession’s control over the market diminished as
regulators began to push deregulatory policies to increase market
competition. One of the first salvos concerned attorney advertising.
157
The focus of this section is on England and Wales. The LSA does not
directly apply to Scotland, but the country passed its own version in 2010. See James
M. McCauley, The Future of the Practice of Law: Can Alternative Business Structures for
the Legal Profession Improve Access to Legal Services?, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 53, 59 (2017);
John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi: The Repercussions for the Legal
Profession after the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537, 539 (2012). One
key difference is that Scotland limits ABS to 49% nonlawyer ownership. See Legal
Services:
Alternative
Business
Structures,
SCOTTISH
GOV’T

https://www.gov.scot/policies/access-to-justice/alternative-business-structures/
[https://perma.cc/MD6M-5ES6]; Garoupa, supra note 18, at 12. Scotland has yet
to pass implementing legislation and the pace of change has been described as
“glacial.” See Neil Rose, Time for Scotland to Embrace ABS, Says Watchdog ,
LEGALFUTURES (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/timefor-scotland-to-embrace-abss-says-watchdog [https://perma.cc/S8W4-WBW8];
Paul Rogerson, ABSs in Scotland: Rarer than Nessi, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE (Aug. 19,
2016),
https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/abss-in-scotland-rarer-thannessie/5057191.article [https://perma.cc/EH2N-GT86].
158 Andrew Boon, Professionalism under the Legal Services Act 2007, 17 INT’L J.
LEGAL PRO. 195, 196 (2010).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Sundeep Aulakh & Ian Kirkpatrick, Changing Regulation and the Future of
the Professional Partnership: The Case of the Legal Services Act, 2007 in England and
Wales, 23 INT’L J. LEGAL PRO. 277, 279 (2016).
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In the early 1980s, the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”), eventually
absorbed into the Competition and Markets Authority, threatened
to divest the profession of authority over advertising if it did not
loosen restrictions. 162 The House of Commons subsequently
legislated on the topic. 163 The profession chose to eliminate its
advertising ban in 1984 before the legislation was put to a vote.164
Subsequent deregulatory activity concerned fees. The UK was
one of the first jurisdictions to embrace conditional fees whereby
attorneys would receive higher fees if they prosecuted suits
successfully.165 The government hoped that conditional fees would
expand access to legal services for low-and-middle income people
and reduce dependence on legal aid.166 In recent years, “no win, no
fee agreements” have also become popular.167
However, it was the 2007 United Kingdom Legal Services Act
(“LSA”) that produced a “seismic” change in the U.K. legal
market. 168 Although the LSA had many objectives, including the
modernization of regulatory systems, one of its main purposes was
to introduce more competition into the UK legal market.169 As the
influential Clementi report that preceded the LSA contended:
[A]ny Regulator of legal services should have as an objective
the prevention of unjustified restrictions on the supply of,
and encourage competition in, the provision of legal services
and the promotion of choice in both the number and type of

Attanasio, supra note 19, at 501.
Id. at 502.
164 Id.
165
Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style
Conditional Fees: Agency Problems and the Supply of Legal Services, 27 MANAGE. DECIS.
ECON. 379, 379 (2006).
166 Richard Moorehead, Conditional Fee Agreements, Legal Aid and Access to
Justice, 33 U. BRIT. COLUM. REV. 471, 472 (2000); see Webley, supra note 118, at 2355
(“To complement civil legal aid the government introduced a market solution to
access justice: a fee regime known as ‘conditional fee arrangements’ . . . These
arrangements were intended to shift financial risk from the state to the
profession.”).
167 Webley, supra note 118, at 2355.
168
Aulakh & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, at 278.
169 See generally Flood, supra note 157, at 542–43 (2012) (describing the genesis
of the Clementi Report and LSA).
162
163
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providers, subject to the proper safeguard of consumers’
interests.170
The LSA opened the U.K. legal market to both ABS and
multidisciplinary practices.171
Commentators have been effusive about the United Kingdom’s
reforms. Flood has described the introduction of ABS as a “big
bang” and suggested that the reforms would be “hazardous” to the
competitiveness of firms operating in less open markets.172 Hadfield
and Rhode have maintained that “consumers are clearly benefiting
from the U.K. changes” and endorse further deregulation to
promote more innovation and the expansion of access to justice.173
The purported success of the U.K. reforms persuaded regulators in
Arizona and Utah to open their own markets to ABS.174
Although one must be cautious in assessing developments in
their early days, the LSA’s impact seems to have been overstated.
The U.K. legal market of today differs from that of a decade ago and
features a greater variety of providers. However, there is little
evidence that the LSA has fundamentally altered the provision of
legal services to clients at either the high or low ends of the market.
With respect to the corporate segment, although large corporate
law firms were swept up into the LSA, regulators have largely
allowed them to pursue their own agendas. 175 The LSA has
especially failed to alter the calculus for globalized law firms
because many of these firms’ services fall outside of the LSA and
170
DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FINAL REPORT 1, 17 (2004),
http://www.avocatsparis.org/Presence_Internationale/droit_homme/PDF/Rap
port_Clementi.pdf [https://perma.cc/X28R-4YJ5 ](emphasis omitted).
171 Flood, supra note 157, at 547–48; see also Aulakh & Kikpatrick, supra note
161, at 282 (“[I]n England and Wales, changing regulation has opened up the
possibility for . . . (the ABS) to emerge in legal services which, in theory, could
represent a significant departure from the professional partnership.”).
172
Flood, supra note 157, at 548–49.
173
Hadfield & Rhode, supra note 29, at 1212–13.
174 See Laurel S. Terry, Lawyer Regulation Stakeholder Networks and the Global
Diffusion of Ideas, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1069, 1092–93 (2020). As the Chief Judge
of Utah’s Supreme Court has explained: “Regulatory reform allows nonlawyers
and innovative legal services to tap into a market that lawyers have not historically
been able to reach.” Deno G. Himonas & Tyler J. Hubbard, Democratizing the Rule of
Law, 16 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 261, 280 (2020).
175
Flood, supra note 17, at 514–21.
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have historically received little scrutiny from municipal
regulators.176 Corporate firms have also benefitted from the LSA’s
emphasis on self-assessment and have successfully lobbied for the
easing of conflict of interests rules that are far more relevant to their
business models.177
Although some firms have restructured as ABS pursuant to the
LSA,178 the vast majority of U.K. firms continue to be professional
partnerships; only one in ten firms are ABS. 179 ABS firms tend to
focus on providing high-volume commoditized services 180 —very
different from the complex transactions typically handed by leading
corporate law firms.181 Many of these commoditized services were
formerly loss leaders for law firms, so greater competition for these
services does not seem to have impacted their bottom lines.182
Even among the small group of boutique firms that service
corporate clients and have formally reorganized, few actually accept
nonlawyer investment.183 As of this writing, only the shares of eight
law firms are publicly traded, and most of these firms provide legal
services alongside non-legal services.184

176 Justine Rogers et al., The Large Professional Service Firm: A New Force in the
Regulative Bargain, 40 U.N.S.W. L.J. 218, 219 (2017); see also Flood, supra note 17, at
513 (“Global law firms are less involved in activities that fall into reserved
categories and therefore do not find themselves hampered as much by local rules
as do those who practice local law.”).
177 Flood, supra note 17, at 513, 518.
178 Jakob Weberstaedt, English Alternative Business Structures and the European
Single Market, 21 INT’L J. LEGAL PRO. 103, 108–09 (2014).
179 See LEGAL SERVS. BD., THE STATE OF LEGAL SERVICES 2020: A REFLECTION ON
TEN YEARS OF REGULATION 17, https://legalservicesboard.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2020/11/The-State-of-Legal-Services-NarrativeVolume_Final.pdf [hereinafter LSB].
180
Aulakh & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, at 286.
181 Flood, supra note 17, at 512–13.
182
See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Commodification of Insurance Defense Practice, 59
VAND. L. REV. 2051, 2062 (2006) (describing flat fee insurance work as a “loss leader”
for law firms).
183 See Aulakh & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, at 290–91 (reporting that less than
a quarter of ABS plan to accept nonlawyer investment).
184 Neil Rose, Mishcon de Reya Confirms Plan to List on Main Stock Exchange,
LEGAL FUTURES (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latestnews/mishcon-de-reya-confirms-plan-to-list-on-main-stock-exchange
[https://perma.cc/4ZNZ-7B9Y].
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Why have corporate firms been reluctant to take advantage of
the flexibility that the LSA affords? The main reason is that
corporate law firms have long been attuned to their clients’ needs
and these clients have never operated “under a yoke of monopoly
constraint.”185 Thus firms have long been investing in technology
and collaborations with nonlawyer professionals to deliver legal
services more efficiently. 186 The development of legal process
outsourcing is a testament to this reality.187
Other factors also appear to be at play. Corporate law is highly
profitable, meaning that U.K. firms operating in this segment have
little need for outside capital. 188 Lawyers are wary not only of
dividing their profits, but also of answering to external constituents
other than their clients.189 From an investor’s perspective, law is a
“sleepy market” and investment decisions are complicated by
lawyers’ duties to their clients and the legal system.190 Conditions
may change in the future, but there is little evidence that the LSA
has enabled U.K. firms to outperform transnational firms based in
other markets.191 To the extent that they eventually seek to do so,
they will likely face significant headwinds, including the possible
alienation of foreign partners.192
In terms of the consumer segment, the LSA has had little impact
on the public’s ability to obtain legal services and access to justice.
A recent retrospective by the U.K. Legal Services Board (“LSB”) has
found that:
Flood, supra note 17, at 513.
Flood, supra note 17, at 513; see also LSB, supra note 179, at 47 (“[C]ity firms
have invested heavily in incubators and new services to serve their clients, but the
public has benefited much less.”).
187 See generally Aaron R. Harmon, The Ethics of Legal Process Outsourcing - Is
the Practice of Law a Noble Profession, or Is It Just Another Business, 13 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 41, 54–55 (2008) (describing various types of LPOs and outsourcing
arrangements).
188
Garoupa, supra note 18, at 24.
189 Aulakh & Kirkpatrick, supra note 161, at 290–91.
190
LSB, supra note 179, at 46; Weberstaedt, supra note 178, at 105.
191 Garoupa, supra note 18, at 24; see also Sydney M. Cone, III, International Legal
Practice Involving England and New York Following Adoption of the United Kingdom
Legal Services Act of 2007, 28 Nw. J. INT’L & BUS. 415, 438 (2008) (predicting that
prestigious and globalized firms would prefer to finance internally).
192 See Garoupa, supra note 18, at 25 (noting Americanization of legal processes
and localism are major challenges).
185
186
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[T]he general feeling among stakeholders is that the scale of
the access challenge is at least as great today, if not greater,
than when the Legal Services Act came into force . . . [T]he
sorts of multi-disciplinary practices that the architects of the
Legal Services Act reforms envisaged have not materialised
as much as expected.193
Whereas firms at the high end of the legal market were already
providing the types of services needed by their clients, minimizing
the impact of deregulation, penetration of ABS into the consumer
market has proven inadequate to overcome barriers faced by lowinformation consumers. 194 Despite the United Kingdom’s
deregulated market, large segments of the population continue to
believe that legal services are too expensive and that the legal system
is stacked against them.195 There is scant evidence that ABS firms
charge less than traditional firms, and the cost of legal services in
England and Wales has inched up steadily.196 Although the United
Kingdom has historically allowed for far more non-lawyer
involvement in the legal market than countries such as the United
States, 197 the LSA increased competition between and among
different classes of providers, causing some confusion among
consumers.198
The dilution of lawyers’ control over the legal market also means
that consumers receive conflicting messages about the availability
and quality of legal services. 199 Some consumers and small
businesses benefit from the commoditized services that ABS
provide, but lower-income individuals are in need of different
services. 200 A deregulated market has proven to be no substitute for
LSB, supra note 179, at 21, 45.
Id. at 22 (“The underlying complexity of many legal issues and the effort
and expertise required to resolve them means professional help will continue to be
out of reach for large parts of the population to fund privately.”); see also STEPHEN
MAYSON, REFORMING LEGAL SERVICES: REGULATION BEYOND THE ECHO CHAMBER 72
(2020) (noting asymmetries between attorneys and clients and inequalities in
representation).
195 LSB, supra note 179, at 21.
196 Id. at 23, 41.
197 Webley, supra note 118, at 2359.
198 Id. at 2359–60.
199 Id. at 2361.
200
MAYSON, supra note 194, at 39.
193
194
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robust legal aid and the UK has seen a rise in self-representation and
increase in unregulated providers, including paid “Mckenzie
friends.”201 The LSA, once regarded as revolutionary, is now decried
as ineffectual and obsolete by leading U.K. commentators.202
b. The European Union
Continental Europe has also experienced significant
deregulation although more unevenly than the United Kingdom.
The driving force of the deregulation agenda in the 2000s has been
European law. 203 “Directive 2005/36/EC on professional
qualifications has consolidated previous directives and has
promoted further integration of professional markets . . . enhancing
competition in the traditionally[,] and still largely protected[,]
European markets for legal services.”204
Several European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) decisions have also
contributed to the deregulation of the European legal market. For
example, the Morgenbesser case defended the principle that free
establishment applies even to those who have not completed their
legal educations in their home states. 205 In addition, Koller 206
determined that a legal degree that is completed in a different
country (in the particular case, Spain) should not preclude access to
the profession in the home country (in the particular case, Austria)
even when the countries maintain different standards as Spain did
not mandate legal training at that time.207 Previously, in the Wouters
201 Id. at 45, 192. The term ‘McKenzie Friend’ originates from a 1970 Court of
Appeal case in which it was confirmed that litigants have a (rebuttable) right to
receive lay assistance. LEANNE SMITH ET AL., A STUDY OF FEE-CHARGING MCKENZIE
FRIENDS AND THEIR WORK IN PRIVATE FAMILY LAW CASES 5 (2017),
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/101919/ [https://perma.cc/9DUW-38HD].
202
MAYSON, supra note 194, at 73
203 Garoupa, supra note 18 at 10-13.
204 Id. at 10; see also Bugatti, supra note 18, at 96-97 (discussing the movement
to re-regulate professional services in Europe from 2005 through 2018).
205
Case C-313/01, Christine Morgenbesser v. Consiglio Dell’Ordine Degli
Avvocati di Genova, 2003 E.C.R. I-13467.
206
Case C-118/09, Koller, 2010 E.C.R. I-13627.
207 See generally Julian Lonbay, The Changing Regulatory Environment Affecting
the Education and Training of Europe’s Lawyers, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 484 (2012)
(examining effects of the European law on training in Spain and other countries).

2022]

Deregulation and the Lawyers’ Cartel

43

case, 208 litigants challenged traditional arrangements such as
prohibition of multidisciplinary partnerships (in the Netherlands)
and, in the Arduino case, 209 fee limitations (in Italy). In both cases,
the ECJ was reluctant to override such practices but stated that
lawyering was not per se excluded from antitrust principles. 210
Moreover, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe
(“CCBE”) has sought to impose some minimum standards in terms
of training and ethics across the European Union, with
repercussions in Spain in particular.211
The support for deregulation has been more visible in court
decisions than in public policy in countries such as Germany and
France, particularly with decisions against lawyers’ regulatory
bodies.212 For example, legal markets in Germany are traditionally
regulated by statute.213 Although such legislation has largely been
immune from competition law, courts have played an important
role because disciplinary action can be exercised both by the bar and
the courts.
The Professional Regulation for Lawyers in 1997 was a
significant development, particularly in connection with
advertising, professional ethics, territorial limitations, and, in time,
legal fees. 214 The German Constitutional Court has also actively
promoted deregulation in a series of decisions beginning in 1987.215
These decisions impacted advertising, employment of lawyers by
non-lawyers, fee arrangements, professional indemnity insurance,
and new forms of partnerships. 216 However, liberalization of fee
208
Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten (NOVA), 2002 E.C.R. I-1577.
209
Case C-35/99 Arduino, 2002 E.C.R. I-1529.
210
See Garoupa, supra note 10, at 463–95 (discussing case law in Europe, in
particular, the immediate implications of the Wouters case).
211 Lonbay, supra note 207, at 484.
212 Garoupa, supra note 18, at 14.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 14-15 (discussing 1997 law); see also Jutta Brunnee, The Reform of Legal
Education in Germany: The Never-Ending Story and European Integration, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 399, 418–22 (1992) (discussing earlier changes to lawyer training); Eckart
Klein, Legal Education in Germany, 72 OR. L. REV. 953, 954 (1993) (contrasting
American and German legal education).
215
For a more detailed discussion, see FRANK H. STEPHEN, LAWYERS, MARKETS
AND REGULATION 74 (2013).
216 See id.
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arrangements is still limited to out of court settlements in Germany,
and some restrictions on multidisciplinary partnerships remain.217
Although lawyers are also regulated by statute in France, the
coexistence of multiple legal service providers in the legal market
has meant that regulation has operated in a decentralized fashion.218
However, two trends in regulatory action in French lawyering are
easy to identify. The first concerns the profession’s effort to exclude
multidisciplinary partnerships (“MDPs”) and nonlawyer
ownership. 219 Lawyers were able to temporarily forestall these
developments, but the Cour de Cassation ultimately decided that
the restrictions were contrary to the EU directive.220 Nevertheless,
ABS and multidisciplinary partnerships continue to be limited and
highly restricted in France. 221 Second, the French bar has been
unable to exclude foreign law firms from the Paris market, again
because of the EU directive, but the tendencies of these foreign firms
to focus on transnational law has blunted the effects on the local
bar.222
Italian governments have also endeavored to deregulate the
country’s legal market. The traditional bans on advertising were
lifted in 2006 and eliminated in 2012. 223 Other deregulatory
innovations include reforming traineeships by limiting training
periods to eighteen months (with the possibility of completion
during law school) and the abolition of the tariffe (traditionally
predetermined by the National Forensic Council with the Ministry
of Justice).224 The legal profession largely resisted these reforms and
has been successful at forestalling others. 225 For example, Italy
nominally accepts MDPs and ABS, but the legal market is
Bugatti, supra note 18, at 100.
Garoupa, supra note 18, at 16.
219 See generally Frank H. Stephen, The European Single Market and the Regulation
of the Legal Profession: An Economic Analysis, 23 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 115, 117
(2002) (noting increasing penetration of MDPs and particularly accounting firms in
France).
220
Garoupa, supra note 18, at 17.
221 Hill, supra note 34, at 180–81.
222
Garoupa, supra note 18, at 17; see also Flood, supra note 17, at 519 (“[Global
firms] operate across EU boundaries by virtue of their corporate practices which
hardly impinge on local law interests, e.g. transactional work vs advocacy.”).
223 Bugatti, supra note 18, at 101.
224 Garoupa, supra note 18, at 17; Bugatti, supra note 18, at 109.
225 See Garoupa, supra note 18, at 17; Bugatti, supra note 18, at 108.
217
218

2022]

Deregulation and the Lawyers’ Cartel

45

dominated almost entirely by small firms that service the local
market and rely on word-of-mouth referrals. 226 The general
situation is one of “immobilism.”227
In Portugal, law graduates are accepted for a training period at
the end of which there is a national bar exam characterized by high
passage rates.228 As one of us has noted, “due to an expansion of
legal education in the mid-1990s, the number of lawyers has
increased considerably in the last decade or so, putting Portugal well
above average in terms of the number of lawyers per capita within
the European Union.” 229 This development has had the effect of
creating more competition in a market traditionally characterized by
strong cartelization and considerable rent-seeking.230 “The response
from the national bar was simple: introduction of a new (national)
bar exam requirement to enter the training period.”231 Portugal has
also been able to largely resist the intrusion of ABS.232 Changes in
advertising rules and organizational forms are more consistent with
a deregulation trend.233
Spain is somewhat of a European outlier inasmuch as the
European Law has arguably led to a more regulated market. Until
about ten years ago, Spain had no bar exam. 234 Law graduates
simply needed to register with the local bar after completing their
degrees, which required five and then four years of study after the
Bologna agreement.235 As a result, other EU members could claim
that Spain was different from the other member states to justify the
non-recognition of Spanish lawyers. To avoid this situation, the
Spanish government introduced a bar exam in 2006, effective from

Bugatti, supra note 18, at 110.
Id. at 111.
228
Garoupa, supra note 18, at 3.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232 See OECD, OECD COMPETITION ASSESSMENT REVIEWS: PORTUGAL CHAPTER 2
(2d.
ed.
2018)),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9789264300606-8en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/9789264300606-8-en
[ https://perma.cc/3DXN-N9A2].
233 Bugatti, supra note 18, at 102–04.
234 Garoupa, supra note 18, at 2.
235 Id.
226
227
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2011. 236 Spain has also limited nonlawyer ownership in ABS to
twenty-five percent.237
In sum, all jurisdictions in Europe have wrestled with
deregulation in one way or another, largely because of the European
Law. However, not all policies enacted have been deregulatory in
nature. Some jurisdictions such as Spain have enhanced barriers to
entry because of the need to harmonize legal services in Europe.238
Most important, for purposes of this Article, is that the sum total
of these changes have not produced major changes in the EU legal
market. Part of the explanation is that lawyers in countries such as
Italy and Portugal have resisted changes that would threaten their
control over local markets. Yet increased competition has also
necessitated the maintenance, and in some cases, expansion of
regulations designed to mitigate externalities and information
asymmetries. 239 Limits on nonlawyer participation in firms in
countries such as France, Germany, and Spain and the adoption of
bar examinations in Spain and Portugal are examples. As Bugatti
has suggested, national bars have maintained control of legal
markets by highlighting risks to consumers posed by liberalization
while practicing business as usual vis à vis the corporate segment. 240
c. Asia
Asian countries have generally been closed to foreign law firms
and maintained high entry barriers such as bar examinations with
pass rates well below ten percent.241 In the 2000s, Japan and South
Korea enacted important legal reforms to modernize the practice of

236 Soledad Atienza, The Evolution of Legal Education in Spain, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC.
468, 473 (2012); Garoupa, supra note 18, at 3.
237
Hill, supra note 34, at 183.
238 Bugatti, supra note 18, at 108–11; Garoupa, supra note 18, at 3.
239 Bugatti, supra note 18, at 112.
240 Id.
241 See, e.g., George Schumann, Beyond Litigation: Legal Education Reform in
Japan and What Japan’s New Lawyers Will Do, 13 UNIV. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
475, 526 (2006) (noting the Japanese bar passing rate being less than three percent
in the 1980s and 1990s; recent statistics show a number closer to 30%); see also
Garoupa, supra note 18, at 19.
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law and to promote more competition. 242 The most immediate
consequence has been the notable increase in passage rates on the
Japanese and Korean bar exams; while still low by American
standards—in many East Asian countries the pass rate remains well
below fifty percent—these rates far exceed historical figures. 243
Nevertheless, the easing of bar examination requirements has
proven less far-reaching than expected, calling into question the
perceived need for more professional lawyers in these countries.244
The legal professions in Taiwan and Hong Kong have largely
maintained entry barriers unlike their counterparts in Japan and
Korea.245
Mainland China is a unique case. For political and historical
reasons dating to the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, the reform of
the legal profession has never been a major priority.246 Passing rates
on the Chinese bar are systematically low (possibly below thirty
percent). 247 Demand for legal services is fundamentally
concentrated in and around Beijing and Shanghai. 248 Legal
education has expanded significantly since the early 1990s, but most
commentators agree that quality is very uneven. 249 In theory, the
242 See generally, e.g., James R. Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamanaka, The New Japanese
Law Schools: Putting the Professional Into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM L. POL’Y J. 303
(2004) (focusing on Japan); Young-Cheol K. Jeong, Korean Legal Education for the Age
of Professionalism: Suggestions for More Concerted Curricula, 5 E. ASIA L. REV. 155 (2010)
(focusing on South Korea).
243 See Shigenori Matsui, Turbulence Ahead: The Future of Law Schools in Japan,
62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 19–20 (2012) (discussing the new bar examination in Japan).
244
Compare Annelise Riles & Takashi Uchida, Reforming Knowledge? A SocioLegal Critique of the Legal Education Reforms in Japan, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 3, 27–28 (2009),
with Mark Ramseyer, Law and Economics in Japan, 2011 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1455, 1455–
74 (2011).
245 Garoupa, supra note 18, at 19.
246
Leland Benton, From Socialist Ethics to Legal Ethics: Legal Ethics, Professional
Conduct, and the Chinese Legal Profession, 28 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 210, 212 (2010).
247
The passing rates have increased after the 2002 modernization of the bar
exam (up from around seven percent in 2002 to around twenty-five percent after
2008). See Garoupa, supra note 18, at 20.
248
Id.
249
See generally Neils J. Philipsen, Regulation of Liberal Professions and
Competition Policy: Developments in the EU and China, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
203, 203 (2010) (“[I]nformation asymmetry may have more relevance in China than
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market is heavily regulated by the government, which considerably
limits foreign influence. 250 However, global law firms have
circumvented regulations by partnering with local firms to establish
footholds in China; the government has in effect sanctified these
arrangements. 251 Chinese firms have also effectively used
globalization to engage in practices that are nominally prohibited in
China, including seeking funding from outside investors and
delivering non-law-related services. 252 The legal profession as a
whole consists of a wide variety of providers and remains highly
fragmented despite governmental efforts to create a more unified
profession.253
The Chinese legal market has become far more sophisticated
since the 1990s to accommodate the country’s rapid growth and
development, but regulation seems to have played almost no role.
Many of the changes that have occurred in more liberalized markets
have also occurred in China because of globalization and the
increased deployment of technology in law. 254 Arguments for
deregulation in the Chinese context focus predominately on the
practical reality that restrictions with respect to foreign firms, ABS,
and MDPs have been ineffectual.255

in Europe . . . the fact that liability rules may not yet be good alternative for (or
supplement to) quality regulation may also make a stronger case for regulation in
China.”); Mark A. Cohen, International Law Firms in China: Market Access and Ethical
Risks, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2569, (2012) (“[I]nternational law firms in China face
enormous difficulties establishing and expanding their presence in the Chinese
legal market.”); Jun Zhao & Ming Hu, A Comparative Study of the Legal Education
System in the United States and China and the Reform of Legal Education in China, 35
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 329 (2012) (examining “legal education reform in China
in the face of both internal requirements of rule of law, as well as external pressures
imposed by globalization”).
250 Jing Li, The Legal Profession of China in a Globalized World: Innovations and
New Challenges, 26 INT’L J. LEGAL PRO. 217, 219 (2019).
251 Id. at 228–29.
252 Id. at 235, 242.
253 Id. at 229–31.
254 Id. at 252.
255 Id. at 253.
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V. REREGULATION: A PATH FORWARD
Thus far we have questioned the impact of deregulatory reforms
on both the corporate and consumer segments and supported our
theoretical analysis via examination of deregulatory reforms in the
United Kingdom, Europe, and Asia. Rather than focusing on
promoting competition generally, we maintain that regulators
should instead seek to combat negative externalities in the corporate
segment of the legal market and information asymmetries in the
consumer segment.
a. The Corporate Segment
The corporate legal sector has largely been unaffected by
deregulatory reforms. As this Article has shown, purportedly
seismic reforms such as the United Kingdom’s LSA have done little
to alter this highly competitive and globalized market. Indeed, firms
based in highly regulated markets such as China seem to be at no
disadvantage vis à vis firms based in liberalized markets such as the
United Kingdom.
These findings stand to reason because corporate clients do not
suffer from information asymmetries and have a greater ability to
monitor and control their attorneys than do regulators. 256 These
clients do not materially benefit from deregulation in areas such as
advertising and fees because of their sophisticated understanding of
the legal services market, which enables them to avoid search costs
and to secure favorable fee arrangements.257 They can also advocate

See supra Part II.a.iv.
Many commentators have attributed the rise of corporate clients’
bargaining power to the 2008 recession. See, e.g., Bernard A. Burk & David
McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the
New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 36–38 (2011); see also Atinuke O. Adediran
et al., Making the Best of a Bad Beginning: Young New York Lawyers Confronting the
Great Recession, 9 NE. U. L.J. 259, 264 (2017) (“The Great Recession was therefore a
major factor that impacted external relationships and internal processes within
organizations, including law practice and the overall organization of the legal
profession.”).
256
257
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for changes in the law that will inure to their benefit via law firms or
otherwise.258
The chief problem with respect to the corporate legal sector is
not information asymmetry but that lawyers will be “captured” by
their clients and fail to forestall negative externalities relating to
their clients’ conduct.259 As Remus has observed, “[i]n the corporate
hemisphere, the principal challenge is to bolster lawyers’
independence from their clients . . . to protect third parties, the
public, and lawyers themselves[.]” 260 Despite widespread
awareness that lawyers might facilitate misconduct and other
negative conduct, the problem is largely unaddressed in the
deregulation literature.
Mandatory reporting is one means of counteracting negative
externalities that follow from client misconduct. For example, in
response to Enron and other high-profile corporate scandals in the
2000s, the American legal profession adopted ethical rules requiring
lawyers who represent organizations to “report up the ladder”
when they become aware of serious unlawful conduct. 261 Under
certain circumstances, lawyers can also report unlawful conduct
outside of their organizations, notwithstanding confidentiality
obligations.262 These rules were adopted under pressure from the
U.S. Congress and financial regulators who sought to empower the
profession vis à vis their corporate clients.263
Restrictions on ABS could also plausibly be justified in terms of
negative externalities. For example, limiting the percentage of
outside investment, as some EU members do, could discourage law
firms from excessive risk-taking in case selection because they are

258 See generally Dana Remus, Hemispheres Apart: A Profession Connected, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2674 (2014) (“Backed by the lawyers and resources of the
corporate hemisphere, corporate clients can engage in legislative and litigationreform campaigns . . . . Examples include efforts to limit the availability of punitive
damages and to exclude certain classes of individual claims from court . . . .”).
259
For a general discussion of the client capture literature, see Ronit
Dinovitzer et al., Unpacking Client Capture: Evidence from Corporate Law Firms, 1 J.
PROF’L & ORGS. 99, 102 (2014).
260
Remus, supra note 258, at 2679–80.
261
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(b).
262
Id.; see also Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 195, 229–30 (2003) (suggesting that the rules do not go far enough).
263 See id. at 228.
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required to maintain “skin-in-the-game.” 264 Similarly, allowing
lawyers to form associations only with other professionals265 could
make it more likely that lawyers will exercise professional
detachment towards their clients and refuse to assist with illegal
acts.266 Although traditional law firms may be no more or less likely
than ABS to forestall their clients’ misconduct, the ability of
regulation to address this problem depends largely on the power of
legal service providers to resist market pressures that are
diminished in deregulated markets.267
In the view of some scholars, deregulation has not caused an
ethical race to the bottom and there is no reason to believe that
nonlawyers are less ethical than lawyers and other professionals.268
Yet, accepting the truth of these claims, corporate clients can more
readily obtain legal assistance that is antithetical to the public
interest in a larger and more heterogenous legal services market.
Clients are willing to pay for “bad” legal advice because “regardless
of its merit, it confer[s] on [corporate clients] a significant measure
of immunity from liability or public criticism.” 269 Greater
competition, in other words, may reduce regulatory capture while
264
For example, the Dodd Frank Act guards against moral hazard by
requiring issuers of securities to retain at least a five percent interest in their
securities. See Adam J. Levitin, Skin-in-the-Game: Risk Retention Lessons from Credit
Card Securitization, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 813, 815–16 (2013).
265 Bugatti, supra note 18, at 104–05.
266 See Hughes, supra note 8, at 660. Regulations directed to specific types of
ABS may also be advisable. For example, accounting firms are increasingly
involved in the legal services market, and some have registered as ABS in the
United Kingdom. See Boon, supra note 158, at 201. However, there are inherent
conflicts in accounting firms providing both audit-related services and legal advice
relating to, inter alia, taxation. See generally Prem Sikka & Mark P. Hampton, The
Role of Accountancy Firms in Tax Avoidance: Some Evidence and Issues, 29 ACCT. F. 325,
333–43 (2005) (discussing KPMG’s marketing of dubious tax shelters to its audit
clients).
267
See Boon, supra note 158, at 196 (observing that the legal profession’s ability
to police standards of behavior in the United Kingdom has been weakened since
the LSA). See generally Remus, supra note 258, at 2677 (“Without the protections of
professional regulation in the corporate hemisphere, the dangers of insufficient
professional independence, long noted by scholars, would be fully realized. There
would be little to stop sophisticated corporate actors from co-opting lawyers into
facilitating excessively aggressive or unethical business schemes.”).
268 Hadfield & Rhode, supra note 29, at 1214–15.
269
William H. Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic Professional
Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2008).
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exacerbating “client capture.” Economists have largely overlooked
that firms are able to compete on the advice they are willing to
provide and not simply on its price and quality.270
b. The Consumer Segment
The chief regulatory problem with respect to the consumer
segment is that individuals in need of legal assistance go without
because they are either unaware of their legal needs or are skeptical
about the value of assistance. 271 These issues bedevil consumers
generally and not merely low-income ones because of general
ignorance about legal services among infrequent users. As leading
empirical researchers have explained:
Well-meaning observers often speak and write as though
access to justice is only an issue for the poor, and assume that
poor people desire lawyers’ services but cannot obtain them
because those services are so very expensive . . . [T]he
picture is much more complex: civil justice problems are
ubiquitous, both poor and nonpoor people typically do not
think of their civil justice problems in legal terms, people
often do not think of lawyers’ services as a helpful route to
solving civil justice problems, private lawyers’ services are
not always that expensive, and concerns about cost play only
a small role in people’s decisions not to turn to lawyers or to
courts.272
Deregulation fails to address this complex and multi-faceted
problem because it is ultimately one caused by information
asymmetries.
Pro-deregulation scholars have at times
acknowledged this point while eliding that what may be needed in
many instances is more regulation, not less.273 Lawyers and other
270
For example, Hadfield’s recent review neglects client capture and negative
externalities entirely. See Hadfield, supra note 2.
271 See generally Markovic, supra note 143, at 73 (summarizing research).
272
Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study
of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 117 (2013).
273 See generally Hadfield, supra note 31, at 49 (defining cost to include “cost to
the consumer of recognizing the need for and then finding, evaluating,
understanding, and implementing the analysis and recommendation”).
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legal services providers face a collective action problem in educating
consumers about their legal needs. 274 Mass market advertising is
expensive and individual lawyers and firms have no incentivize to
educate the public about the importance and availability of legal
services when they could instead tout their own services and
prices. 275 Many of the nascent advances in the consumer market
stem not from deregulation but from technological developments
that have facilitated individual consumers’ access to legal
information.276
The LSA has received virtually all of the scholarly attention, but
regulators in the United Kingdom are increasingly focusing on legal
market interventions to address informational asymmetries. For
example, the LSB recently began to require solicitors and other
professional groups to post price and service information on their
websites that comparatively few providers had disclosed
previously. 277 The purpose of this requirement is to lower search
costs for consumers, and there is some evidence that this measure
has already led to more comparison shopping.278 UK regulators also
operate a website dubbed “Legal Choices” that helps people to
understand their rights as citizens and how to choose lawyers. 279
Individual firms and lawyers would have little incentive to provide
the information provided by Legal Choices.
Another way that the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions
confront information asymmetries in the consumer segment is by
relying on nonlawyer intermediaries to connect consumers with
legal assistance. The United Kingdom has long maintained
government-funded citizen advice bureaus that are staffed by
nonlawyers and “provide advice about how to handle justice issues
and many other kinds of problems remotely over the Internet or
274 See generally Erika J. Rickard, The Role of Law Schools in the 100% Access to
Justice Movement, 6 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUAL. 240, 248-49 (2018) (“The justice system
faces a collective action problem . . . [E]fforts to enhance access to justice are
generated by individual stakeholders, each of which is limited both by its own selfinterest and by the dearth of knowledge about effective ways of addressing legal
needs.”).
275
Elizabeth Chambliss, Marketing Legal Assistance, 148 DAEDALUS 98, 102
(2019).
276 Markovic, supra note 143, at 92-93.
277 LSB, supra note 179, at 42.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 16.
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telephone, or personally at more than 3,000 locations around the
country.” 280 For some consumers, advice from bureaus will be
sufficient, but for many others, they will serve as entry points to fullscale legal representation.
Similarly, recent research conducted in the Canadian province
of Ontario points to the crucial role that community organizations
play in advising lower-income individuals about their rights and
empowering them to seek redress for violations of those rights.281
Legal problems often have nonlegal dimensions, and individuals are
far more likely to trust members of their communities than
attorneys. 282 Although nonlawyers based in not-for-profits and
charitable organizations are not supposed to provide legal
assistance in Ontario, many of these organizations function as de
facto citizen advice bureaus, and there is little apparent appetite to
disrupt them. 283 Formalizing relationships between the not-forprofit and charitable sectors and lawyers and other legal service
providers would undoubtedly benefit consumers.284
Regulators could also seek to foster greater cooperation between
lawyers and nonlawyers in the private sector by removing
impediments to referral fee arrangements.285 In the United States,
lawyers can pay referral fees only to other attorneys, and referral
fees are also uncommon in much of Europe. 286 The theoretical
280
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and
Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949, 964 (2009).
281 JULIE MATHEWS & DAVID WISEMAN, COMMUNITY JUSTICE HELP: ADVANCING
COMMUNITY-BASED
ACCESS
TO
JUSTICE
15–16
(2020),
https://www.srln.org/node/1472/paper-community-justice-help-advancingcommunity-based-access-justice-cleo-2020 [https://perma.cc/Y85D-22PF].
282 Id. at 15.
283 See id. at 18 (noting that there are no documented cases of prosecutions of
non-profits for the unauthorized practice of law).
284
Although beyond this Article’s purview, in the United States it is an open
question whether charities and non-profits can be engaged in the unauthorized
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justification for restricting referral fees is to ensure that clients are
not steered to unqualified or unscrupulous attorneys, but any risk
of undue influence in the selection of counsel could be mitigated by
requiring attorneys and other providers to disclose referral
arrangements and payments to prospective clients. 287 Prohibitions
on referral fees have also impeded lawyers’ ability to work with
technology companies that have created platforms that link
consumers and lawyers.288
As Abel has explained, the legal profession has been unable to
unify behind measures that increase demand for legal services. 289
Whether it may do so in the future—if only to forestall greater
deregulation and diminution of its own standing and power—
remains to be seen. However, collective action problems will only
be more acute in deregulated markets characterized by
heterogenous providers, necessitating governmental intervention
and involvement.290
To address the problem of access, regulators should concentrate
on improving the information that is available to consumers. They
should also engage with nonlawyer intermediaries to educate the
public about the need for and availability of legal services.
Deregulation alone fails to confront the market failures that are
endemic in the consumer segment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Countries across much of the world have deregulated aspects of
their legal markets over the last thirty years. Scholars drawing on
public choice theory have exposed inefficiencies and persuaded
regulators to deregulate in areas ranging from fees and advertising
to organizational forms. Although these reforms have promoted
greater competition and diminished the legal profession’s
dominance of legal markets in certain jurisdictions, we have not seen
Markovic, supra note 143, at 91.
For an in-depth discussion of one such technological service, see Alberto
Bernabe, Avvo Joins the Legal Market; Should Attorneys Be Concerned?, 104 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 184 (2016).
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290 Webley, supra note 118, at 2360.
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the transformation that many commentators expected. Supply-side
reforms have not fundamentally changed markets or altered clients’
legal spending decisions.
Even the United Kingdom—the
jurisdiction that has most internalized the deregulatory, procompetition ethos—has begun to recognize the inadequacy of
focusing predominately on market structure.
This inertia in legal markets is not entirely surprising when we
consider both the traditional rationales for professional selfregulation and the segmentation of legal markets. Sophisticated
corporate entities have long been able to avoid regulations that they
regard as cumbersome and have sufficient bargaining power to
demand efficiencies that may not be contemplated by existing
regulations. Conversely, the consumer segment is plagued by
informational asymmetries that impede access to legal services.
Focusing on increasing the number and types of providers fails to
address informational asymmetries and may in fact exacerbate
them.
This Article does not deny that professional self-regulation can
be self-serving or that some deregulation is advisable. However,
regulators should approach the corporate and consumer segments
differently. The chief danger with respect to the corporate segment
is not exploitation but rather negative externalities associated with
the provision of legal services by (potentially captured) providers.
With respect to the consumer segment, regulators should intervene
to ensure that consumers receive reliable information about their
legal needs and the availability of legal services. Barriers to
cooperation between lawyers and nonlawyers impedes access to
justice and should also be reconsidered.
Notwithstanding
globalization,
rapid
technological
advancement, and various forms of deregulation, legal markets
continue to be dominated by lawyers. We do not see this dynamic
changing in the foreseeable future, but regulators are able to make
legal markets more efficient if they do not wed themselves solely to
the deregulatory competition paradigm.

